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Summary
My thesis studies how the public policies would a¤ect economies in term
of growth and welfare in the open economy setting. Most of the studies
on public policies are either on closed economy or on open economies with
North-South setting where the North comes out with the new innovations
from which variety of products come and the South learns to imitate the
innovations from the North and produce the goods on their own. This is the
most asymmetric setting where one is a leader and the other is a follower.
However, in reality we observe that the economies that compete can be of
di¤erent degree of asymmetry. In my thesis, I would look at three di¤erent
degrees.
The rst chapter studies how two symmetric economies - both innovate and
produce their own innovated products - would choose their R&D subsidies
in response to the other economy. In a model with two open economies of
the same characteristics - both innovate and produce nal goods from these
innovations, we show that subsidies from either economy will increase the
global growth rate, regardless of which economy subsidizes more. Also we
show in a special case where we assume that the economies stick to a uniform
subsidy rate, there is an optimal subsidy rate that gives us highest global
welfare. Numerically, we show that there is an optimal set of subsidy rates
employed by each economy that gives highest global welfare (we call this
4optimal total welfare). Furthermore, we show numerically that there is an
optimal subsidy rate for each economy given the others choice of subsidy,
thus proposing the presence of a Nash equilibrium where each economy
would respond optimally to the others subsidy choice. Examining the total
welfare (the two economieswelfare combined), we nd that the total welfare
in the Nash equilibrium is smaller than the optimal total welfare. This opens
up another discussion of how economies can cooperate to achieve highest
welfare together but at the same time, each can choose to deviate from
the agreement to the best response given the other economy sticking to the
agreement.
In the second chapter, we consider a less symmetric economic setting. There
are two economies: the rst acts as a leader (North) where innovations are
produced and protected with patents, the second is the follower (South)
who would learn to standardize those innovations whose patent protections
have been expired in the North. The standardization can be understood
as the process of innovating a method that can mass produce a particu-
lar variety from the leading economy. The products are not available to
be standardized while they are still under patent in their origin economy.
Once the product is successfully standardized, it would be protected by the
economy where standardization occurs. This standardization is useful and
costly, so rms that manage to standardize the products are given some pe-
riod of patent protection in their economy. After the standardized products
patents expire, these products will become perfectly competitive. This is a
product cycle with three stages. We want to nd out how each economy
should choose the best patent policies for their respective product. In this
paper, we introduce three di¤erent assumptions of knowledge pool that the
standardizing economy may have: (1) all knowledge available that is all in-
5novations produced by the innovating economy; (2) knowledge that includes
only those products whose patents are expired in the innovating economy;
(3) knowledge that includes only those products whose patents are expired in
the innovating economy and that are not yet standandardized. We can show
how the patent length can a¤ect the growth rate and standardization rate
di¤erently under these three di¤erent assumptions. For the optimal patent
lengths, through numerical examples, we nd that for all three assumptions,
there is a nite optimal patent length for the innovating economy while the
standardizing economy should have innite patent length.
The third chapter species two economies whose symmetry is in between the
two cases in the rst two chapters. There is a leading economy (U) which
produces original innovations and a following economy (J) which makes use
of the original innovations and produce innovations that have the similar
concepts with the original ones - being implemented in di¤erent technological
applications. We call economy Js innovations as branch innovations. Here
we allow the branch innovations to have feedback e¤ect on the knowledge
pool of the North. First, we examine the economies with elastic homogenous
labour - that is, labour can be used in both R&D and manufacturing sectors.
After that, we introduce two types of labour in each economy - skilled and
unskilled. From here, we can analyse how the wage ratios within an economy
and across economies would be a¤ected by the reverse spillover e¤ect. The
unskilled can only work in the manufacturing sector while the skilled can
work in both R&D and manufacturing sectors. Here, we do not consider
leisure, thus the labour is inelastic. We study how R&D subsidies in each
economy would help the economic growth and welfare. Similar to chapter
one, there is a Nash equilibrium in which each economy would choose a
subsidy rate that best responds to the others. Also, we nd that if the
6reverse spill-over e¤ect is su¢ ciently, it is possible that economy J should
not subsidize at all. But for a larger reverse spill-over e¤ect, there exists
an optimal subsidy rate that economy J should choose for each subsidy rate
chosen by economy U.
How the economies work in three chapters are illustrated in the following
three diagrams.
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Chapter 1
R&D subsidies in open
symmetric economies
1.1 Introduction
Economists using endogenous growth models have focused their studies on
how R&D subsidies a¤ect growth and welfare in a closed economy settings
and very few studies have been done on the welfare in the open economies.
In a closed economy, we can only analyse the economy as standing alone
without any interaction with others. Whereas in open economies there are a
few important questions that we can ask. Firstly, how would the policies in
one economy a¤ect the others in terms of growth and welfare? Secondly, is
there any way that these economies can cooperate in policy-making in order
to achieve higher welfare? Many studies on open economies look at the
North-South setting where the North is the leading economy and the other
would imitate the Norths products and take over that business. However,
we would like to investigate how subsidy policies in two economies with
similar characteristics would interact with each other (i.e. both economies
2are of North type). In this paper, we attempt to look into these questions
through examining subsidies on R&D. In globalization era where economies
join in World Trade Organization, many economies, facing restrictions in
trade policies and production subsidies, choose to protect the domestic goods
by subsidizing R&D activities (Impullitti (2010)). The model that we use
here is a variety-expansion model. We study both trade between the two
economies and also the knowledge spill-over e¤ect.
The rms that invest in R&D activities face knowledge spillover which might
lead to the under-investment in the R&D activities1 (see Minniti Antonio
et. al. (2013), Jones and Williams (1998) . The rms do not take into
consideration of the externality of their innovations which benet the soci-
ety as a whole. This has already been discussed in many studies such as
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Jones and William (2000). As such the need for the governments in-
tervention to boost up the R&D activities through di¤erent policies like
patenting and R&D subsidy. Here we look at the R&D subsidy. Quite a
number of researches have been done on the e¤ect of R&D subsidies in a
closed economy (eg. Zeng and Zhang (2007), Segerstrom (2000), and Gomez
and Sequeria (2012)2). Zeng and Zhang (2007) study subsidies in both R&D
and purchasing of intermediate goods with elastic labour in a closed econ-
omy. They nd R&D subsidies perform better in improving the welfare
than the subsidies of purchasing intermediate goods; however, there exists a
combination of both kinds of subsidies that outdo both individually. Gomez
and Sequeria (2012) look at the optimal R&D subsidies to eliminate three
1Depending on the model specication, we can have over-investment. For example,
Comin (2004) suggests that when the R&D investment contribute little to the Total Factor
Productivity, over-investment can occur; Chu and Cozzi (2012) discuss over-investment in
R&D in a Schumpeterian model with Cash-in-advance constraints on consumption.
2Long-run growth e¤ect of R&D subsidies
3sources of ine¢ ciency: monopolistic competition in the intermediate-goods
sector, duplication externalities and spill-overs in R&D. Segerstrom (2000)
analyses the long-run growth e¤ect of R&D subsidies; his model has two
dimensions - horizontal and vertical innovations. He nd that the long-run
growth rate can decrease if the R&D subsidies promote the kind of innova-
tion that is the weaker engine of growth. The reasons for R&D subsidies to
promote wrong kind of innovation (horizontal or vertical) is that the right
kind may have higher diminishing returns. Though the literature on R&D
subsidies in closed economy has already been well researched, as far as we
are concerned, few studies examine the open economies. Hardly can we nd
any study on R&D subsidies where both economies are similar in charac-
teristics - both being capable of producing innovations and nal products.
Some are of North-South type, where the North is the leader in innovation
where the South is the follower which only copies what the North has done
(eg. Liao and Wong (2009) and section 4 of Grossman and Helpman (1991)).
Grossman and Helpman (1989a) look into R&D subsidy in small and open
economy and nd that the R&D subsidy policy can help to achieve rst-best
growth but not the rst-best welfare. Moreover, their model lacks the inter-
action between the economies where we can understand more about how the
trade between the economies; also, the small open economy must follow the
world interest rate so in that sense, it does not inuence any other economy.
Pügera and Suedekumb (2012) look at how subsidies in terms of lowering
the entry costs in a two-open-economy model but they focus more on the
relationship of entry subsidies in the Nash equilibrium and the level of trade
freeness3. In this research, we employ the endogenous growth model with
variety expansion and focus on the R&D subsidy policies in open economies
3Subsidizing rm entry in open economies
4of similar characteristics4. Our model is adopted from Grossman and Help-
man (1990) with some alteration. In Grossman and Helpman (1990), there
are three sectors - R&D, intermediate goods and nal goods. All need labour
as an input of production. Labour is used in producing R&D, intermediate
goods and nal goods. Subsidies to the R&D activities in terms of cost
reduction help to induce more investment in the R&D sector to gain from
the extra prots. Due to the spill-over e¤ect of knowledge, the growth rate
of innovations rises, beneting the society. Another interesting point in this
model is that besides spill-over of knowledge within an economy, we have
another level of knowledge spill-over across the economies. Ertur and Koch
(2011) make use spatial econometrics to study the global interdependence
by looking at international R&D spillovers. They nd that increasing R&D
expenditures by 1% in USA would have impact of 0.5654% on total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) of all other OECD countries, followed by Germany
0.422% and Japan 0.3514%. Keller (2001) discusses the three channels -
trade, foreign direct investment and direct communication - through which
knowledge ows and nds that trade is the most important one5. Acharya
and Keller (200;) nds that import liberalization raises productivity through
technological learning if the imports involve advanced foreign technologies.
Coe and Helpman (1995) nds that R&D capital stocks of an economy and
its trade partners have a great e¤ect on the TFP of that economy. Peri
(2005) shows that among economies, besides trade ows, knowledge ows
also impact the productivity and innovation. He even shows that "knowl-
edge ows reach much farther".
4Beside Grossman and Helpman (1990), we have Grossman and Lai (2004) using a
model with two economies with similar characteristics discuss the e¤ects of patent protec-
tion. Few papers discuss two economies of similar characteristics.
5Keller (2004) reviews empirical results on technology di¤usion with di¤erent chan-
nels like trade and foreign direct investment. He also discusses on spatial distribution of
technological knowledge.
5There are studies on how economies of similar characteristics can cooper-
ate with one another to achieve higher benets for all. Grossman and Lai
(2004) construct a model that studies the optimal patent lengths in an open
economy where the world consists of two economies of di¤erent market sizes
and productivities for R&D. Because of the di¤erences in market sizes and
productivities in R&D, the optimal patent policies are di¤erent. In open
economies, naturally, we can see how economies can enjoy from their coop-
eration in term of trade. During the late 80s and early 90s, many studies
focus on how trade can have an e¤ect on the long run rate of growth, among
those are Feenstra (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1989a,1989b,1989c) ,
Romer (1990), Segerstrom, Anat, and Dinopoulos (1990), and Young (1991).
Rivera-Batiz and Romer(1991) examine how economic integration can lead
to the increase of worldwide growth rate if the increasing return to scale in
research and development sector is exploited. What we contribute, besides
trade and intellectual property rights protection, in this chapter is to study
how economies would make use of the knowledge spill-over e¤ect to coop-
erate with each other in R&D subsidies. Grossman and Helpman (1990)
mention that small and uniform subsidy rate applied to both economies of
similar characteristics would increase growth rate.
Grossman and Helpman (1990) is a very comprehensive model that illus-
trates the across-country knowledge spill-over. There are two economies of
similar characteristics would interact with one another. We can consider
them as two large economies like the OECD and USA. The governments
of economies then have to take into consideration of the knowledge exter-
nalities into their policy making. They show how subsidies of some small
amount can help global growth and also that the subsidy from the econ-
omy that has comparative advantage in R&D would help the growth rate;
6little discussion was on the welfare. Our results di¤er from Grossman and
Helpman (1990). We show that subsidies from either economy will increase
the global growth rate, regardless of which economy subsidize more. Also
we show in a special case where economies are assumed to employ uniform
subsidy rate, there is an optimal subsidy rate that gives us highest global
welfare. Numerically, we show that there is an optimal set of subsidy rates
employed by each economy that gives highest global welfare (we call this op-
timal total welfare). Furthermore, we examine the level e¤ects and growth
e¤ects in the welfare functions to show that possibly, there is an optimal
subsidy rate for each economy given the others choice of subsidy. Impul-
litti (2010) studies how the technological catch-up of Japan and European
economies a¤ect USs choice of optimal choice of R&D subsidy. He nds
that the increasing competition from foreign economies causes USs optimal
domestic R&D subsidy to be higher. By using the quantitative analysis, he
even shows that the US government responds optimally to the competition
from the foreign economies - namely Japan and European economies. Then,
we show numerically this is true, thus proposing the presence of Nash equi-
librium where each economy would respond optimally to the others subsidy
choice. Examining the total welfare (the two economieswelfare combined),
we nd that the total welfare in Nash equilibrium does not give the optimal
total welfare. This opens up the discussion of how economies can cooperate
to achieve highest welfare together but at the same time, each can choose
to deviate from the agreement to the best response given the other economy
sticking to the agreement.
71.2 Model
1.2.1 Overview
We construct a simplied version of the model proposed in Grossman and
Helpman (1990) which consists of two economies of similar structure. In
this setting, the world economy has two economies, each of which engages
two activities of production: nal goods and innovations (R&D). And in
both sectors, the only factor in production is labour. In this model, some
labour would be spent in R&D sector where they would create innovations
which are the new ideas of producing nal goods. After one innovation is
produced, it will be implemented in nal-goods-producing sector to produce
new nal goods. The rest of the labour, which are not employed in the R&D
sector would be employed in the nal-goods production sector. Since the
nal-goods producing rms are monopolistic therefore they will mark up the
price from the marginal cost. The marginal cost is based on the wage paid
out to the labour. The products are sold locally as well as abroad so each
economy would have both exports and imports since every nal goods are
demanded by consumers in both economies. The prot earned by the nal-
goods producing sector would be used to fund the R&D activities - that is,
to pay the wages of the R&D labour. We assume the two sectors - R&D and
nal goods production - belongs to one particular rm. The leftover revenue
that does not go to wages in both sectors would be the ultimate prot of
the rm. However, in the steady state, the ultimate prots would be zeros;
the prot earned in the nal-goods producing sector would be just enough
to pay for the wages in R&D sector. The intuition for this condition is that
if there is any potential extra gains from the economic system, other rms
would enter the market to extract that. In the end, each rm would have
8zero prot. Here we introduce R&D subsidy from the government in term
of proportional R&D cost reduction. This subsidy would encourage R&D
rms to invest even more into this activity which then a¤ects the growth
rate of the world economy. The growth rate is determined by the growth
of innovations or, in another word, of variety of products. The subsidy has
positive e¤ects on the growth rate and thus the welfare of each household.
However, as we will show later on that there is an optimal subsidy rate for
each economy given the other economys choice of subsidy rate - beyond
that welfare would start to be lower.
1.2.2 Household
In each economy, there is a representative household, who will provide its
endowed labour, measured in time, to earn wages. However, this setting
would not change the general results of the model. The two economies are
populated by a representative household, however each has di¤erent labour
endowment - i.e. economy i has Li units of time endowment, i = 1; 2.
The household lives forever. Besides earning wages from the working, each
household also enjoy asset income from the ownership of the rm. Now, as
the R&D rm has not realized their potential prot which only comes in
the production process, most of the nance has to be funded by the savings
provided by the household in each respective economy. Households in both
economy share identical preferences. Each household is modeled as a family




e ( t)flog ui()g d (1.1)
where  is the discount rate, ui() is the static utility of the household at
time  :












and xi(!; ) is the quantity of product variety of type ! demanded by econ-
omy i at time  , n is the number of product varieties available at time
 in the world economy. Thus, n is the total number of innovations that
have been created in both economies - that is n = n1 + n2 (where ni is
the number of innovations created in economy i by time  . As we can see
from (1.2), there is an assumption that the varieties are substitute; so here
 measures the product di¤erentiation. Dene  = 11  , this  is then the
elasticity of substitution between the product varieties;  > 1: From now,
we prefer to omit the time subscript t whenever no confusion can arise its
budget constraint.
Each household will maximize its utility subject to its budget constraint:




i (!; ) d!;
where ai is the asset that each household i has and _ai is the time derivative 
of ai, r is the rate of return to asset in the steady state, Li is the total 
labour of that household and xi (!) is the amount of product ! consumed 
by economy i, and wi () denotes the wage rate in economy i at time , ti is the 
tax rate that each household has to pay in order to fund the subsidy of R&D. 
Px (!; ) to be the price of product ! at time : Due to the symmetric property 
of the model - that is, all goods are treated equally in the basket of goods 
consumed by each household, all rms within an economy would pay the 
same wage rate and charge the same price. Prices across the economies would 
be di¤erent due to the di¤erences in factors that a¤ect the prot
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maximization. Denote Px1 to be the price set in economy 1 and Px2 price in
economy 2. We have wi ()Li () (1  ti) being the after tax income. Now let
the static budget constraint of the household be
R n
0 Px (w; )x
i (!; ) d! 
Ei () and solve the household maximization problem in two stages where
the rst stage is to maximize log ui() subject to the budget constraint and




e ( t)flog f (Ei(); P x1 () ; Px2 ())g d
subject to the
_a () = ra () + wi ()Li () (1  ti)  Ei () ;
where f (Ei(); P x1 () ; Px2 ()) is the solution of the rst stage.
Now let us solve each economys maximization problem. Each person in
economy i will maximise static utility subjected to the chosen expenditure
at time  .
Let xi (w) be the amount of variety ! that economy i demands. In economy














Subject to the budget constraint





























where the shadow price denoted by i where i denotes the economy. And













 = iPx2; (1.4)
where xji is the amount of product of any type produced by economy i and








Ei is the expenditure consumed by economy i: Note that the revenue that
economy i received from selling its products would be spent in order to have
a balance budget at all time- therefore Ei = PxiXi, where Xi is the total
amount of product produced by economy i:




= _Ri    (1.5)
The Eulers equation applies to both economy and in the steady state, we
have the rate of return to investment to be the same. As such, dening the






where _R = _R1 = _R2 and in the steady state _R = r:
Also, Since all products within an economy are treated the same in our model
so by symmetry the demand for each product of economy i would be the
same. Solving (1.3) (together with (1.4))), we have the demand for product














and thus is the consumer price index; and
xi is the amount of any product produced by economy i (here, the amount
produced by economy i is equal to the demands of this product by both
economy - i.e. xi = x1i +x
2
i . This demand depends on the total expenditure
of the world (because the products are demanded in both economies) and
the relative price (with respect to the price level).
1.2.3 Production and Market
Firms producing di¤erent types of products would compete in prices to max-
imize their prot. In our model, all products are substitutional to some de-
gree so there is always price competition among the rms in both economies.
Assume that the production in each rm is constant returns to scale and all
rms within a economy i needs axi units of labour to produce one unit of
goods. Assuming the patent for each innovation lasts forever, the producer
of any product ! engages in oligopolistic competition by choosing Px (!) to
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maximize prot at any point in time. The prot of a rm in economy i
would be given as:
i = (Pxi   axiwi)xi (1.7)
The right-hand side is the di¤erence between the revenue and the cost. We




n1Px11  + n2P 1 x2





n1Px11  + n2P 1 x2

 fPx2   w2ax2gE (1.9)
Here 1 and 2 denote prots in economy 1 and 2: We simplify these two
notations because the prot for any rm within an economy would be the
same, again due to the symmetry.
Choosing Pxi to maximize prot results in the usual monopolistic pricing:
Pxi = wiaxi
The marginal cost is wiaxi in economy i and is only a fraction, ; of the
price which is the marginal revenue. That is to say the price is marked up
by a factor of 1 :






















In order to produce one innovation, each rm in economy i would need
ani=Kt units of labour, where Kt is the disembodied knowledge pool of
the world. Any rm can freely enter the market and access to the world
knowledge pool to produce its innovations. This knowledge pool is a public
good that is nonrival and nonexcludable. As the knowledge produced by
each economy grows over time, so does Kt: We assume that Kt = nt =
n1t + n2t: So, the research sector would be characterized by the following
equation:
_ni = Lnin=ani;
where ni is the accumulated amount of innovations in economy i, Lni is the
amount of labours employed in research sector, and ani is the productivity
parameter in R&D sector of economy i. Observe that the lower ani, the
higher the productivity of the R&D sector. The knowledge is free to all and
there is no lag in the di¤usion of knowledge. Also, in the research sector, the
only input is the labor; this means that the only cost borne is from payment
to research workers.
1.2.5 R&D and incentive
Let Vit be the discounted expected prots of a rm in economy i at time t:
Since the amount of labour to produce one variety is ani=nt, we have the
total cost of producing that variety to be witani=nt: Also, let zi be the rate
at which economy i subsidize its local rmsR&D cost. Since we have free
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entry, in equilibrium, Vit should be equal to the total cost. Let R(t) is the




e [Ri() Ri(t)]i()d = (1  zi)witani=nt = (1  zi) cni(t)
where cni(t) is the research and development costs of producing the variety.
Using Leibnizs rule for di¤erentiation of integrals, di¤erentiating the above
expression with respect to t would produce:
rVi = _Vi + i; (1.12)
where rt = _R1t = _R2t in steady state.
Note that we have the total benet to be equal to the total cost, that is
Vi = (1  zi) cni: While the R&D rm can only get back to break-even in
the innite time because the cost also covers all prots in future. However,
we assume a perfect nancial market that can always help rms to pay for
the R&D cost before realizing the prot ows. Also, the stock market helps
the households to diversify the portfolios in order to achieve zero risk. This
means that all households face the same interest rate within an economy.
To have no arbitrage between the two economies, the interest rate in both
economies must be also the same. Equation (1.12) means that the returns to
investment, Vi; (since the rm borrows Vi in steady state to pay for its R&D
activity, Vi = (1  zi) cni) must be equal to the prot at that time and the
rate of change in the value of the rm which is Vi. In steady state, _Vi = 0.
To see this we have to see that it is necessary for the price Pxi to grow at
the same rate with the growth rate of varieties in steady state. We assume
there is no way that a rm can earn extra prot in the long run because of
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the free entry - that is Vit = (1  zi) cni: With that we can rewrite (1.12),
as:
i
(1  zi) cni = rt (1.13)
This above equation means that both economies in the steady state would
have same rate of returns on investment, so we have:
1
(1  z1) cn1 =
2
(1  z2) cn2 (1.14)
Substitute (1.10) and cni = witani=nt into (1.14) and simplify this expres-
sion, we have:
P x1
(1  z1) (an1=ax1) =
P x2
(1  z2) (an2=ax2)
From here, we can examine the price ratio to understand how demand for
goods is a¤ected by it. Also, the price ratio is useful for computation of









Here, an1=ax1 measures the comparative advantage of economy 1 (similar
to Grossman and Helpman (1990)) and an2=ax2 is that of economy 2. If
an1=ax1 < an2=ax2; we are saying that economy 1 has more comparative
advantage than economy 2. Thus, the price ratio depends on the compar-
ative advantages and the subsidy rates of both economy. The higher the
subsidy rate in economy i will lead to higher relative price of the respective
economy. If economy 1 has higher comparative advantage, the relative price
of economy 1 would be higher.
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1.2.6 Government Budget
The government would tax the labour and transfer the tax revenue to the
R&D sector to subsidize the cost of R&D activities. However, as the gov-
ernment carries out the policy, they rst have to decide what is the rate at
which they would subsidize the R&D cost; and then based on the amount




The left-hand side is the amount of subsidy that the government have to
give; the total cost of R&D sector at any point in time is the amount of wage
paid to the labour needed to produce _ni innovations and thus the fraction
zi of the total cost is the amount of subsidy. On the right-hand side is the
amount of tax collected - equal the tax rate times the total labour income.
Both sides are equal to have governments budget balance.
1.2.7 Labour markets
In both economies, labour is allowed to freely move across the sectors. The
market competition would produce the allocation of labour between the two
sectors. Wages are determined also by the demand and supply in the labour
market. In economy i (i = 1; 2), the amount of labour needed in R&D sector
is _niani=n - the number of new varieties at any point in time is _ni while the
amount of labour to produce one variety is ani=n: The total demand for
goods in economy i is nixi (= Xi) so thus the amount of labour needed to
produce all the goods from the R&D ideas is axiXi: As such, we have the
following:
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(ani=n) _ni + axiXi = Li (1.17)
These two labour market clearing conditions are the equilibrium conditions
which we are going to specify in the next section.
1.3 Equilibrium
From the labour market clearing conditions of the two economies, we can
specify the equilibrium of the model - that is to solve for the variables,
mainly the growth rate and the share of variety of economy 1, in terms of
the parameters.
The number of nal goods produced in each economy would determine the
amount of labour spent on manufacturing. From (1.13), (1.7) and ci =
wiani=ni = Pxi (ani=axi) =ni, we have the demand for nal goods of any
type in economy i:
xi =
(1  zi)anir
n (1  ) axi ;
The amount of labour spent on R&D sector in economy i is _nin ani, so making
use of the fact that _nini = g; and denote i =
ni
n , we rewrite the labour market
clearing condition as:







(1  ) + g

iani
In the steady state, r = g + . So the above equation expresses a very
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(1  zi) (g + ) + g (1  ) (1.18)
Thus, we have the following two equations:
1 =
[L1=an1] (1  )
(1  z1) (g + ) + g (1  ) (1.19)
(1  1) = [L2=an2] (1  )
(1  z2) (g + ) + g (1  ) (1.20)
These two equations can be combined into one:
[L1=an1] (1  )
(1  z1) (g + ) + g (1  ) +
[L2=an2] (1  )
(1  z2) (g + ) + g (1  ) = 1 (1.21)
Clearly we can see that the left-hand side is decreasing in g. As g ! 1;
the left-hand side goes to zero. Therefore, in order for (1.21) to have unique
root, we just have to ensure that the left-hand side is bigger than one when
g = 0: That gives us:
1 <
[L1=an1] (1  )
(1  z1) (0 + ) + 0: (1  ) +
[L2=an2] (1  )















where H = L1=an1 + L2=an2:
As we increase z1; from (1.21) as z1 falls; we must have g to increase. The
rise in g is intuitive because as one economy subsidizes the R&D sector,
more innovations would be produced from this economy and the knowledge
pool of the world, n, will increase, causing a positive spill-over e¤ect to the
other economys R&D sector. Thus, the growth rate of the world economy
would be higher. This causes higher 1  that is, the share of varieties from
economy 1 will increase, and higher growth rate. Similarly, if z2 increases,
we also have g to increase. This causes higher 2 or lower 1  that is,
the share of varieties from economy 2 will increase, and higher growth rate.
Hence, we can make the rst claim in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique equilibrium with positive 1 and g
if H > 1  : An increase in the subsidy rate zi increases i and g.
The result of Proposition 1 is di¤erent from Grossman and Helpman (1990)
where the subsidy of R&D activity can only benecial to the growth rate in
steady state if the policy is from economy i that has comparative advantage
in R&D that is axiani >
axj
anj
and the shares of spending on the nal goods
are constant (where i is the economy with the comparative advantage while
j is the other economy). Here, our nding shows that the comparative
advantage does not matter, as long as there is an increase in subsidy of
either economy, the worlds growth rate will increase. This is due to the
fact that in our model, there are only two sectors - R&D and production;
whereas, in Grossman and Helpman (1990), there are three sectors- nal
goods, intermediate goods and R&D; and labour is also the sole input. The
R&D sector in Grossman and Helpman (1990) is the same as ours, while our
nal goods sector is the intermediate goods sector in Grossman and Helpman
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(1990). They introduce another sector which is nal goods sector where
the composite of intermediate goods from both economies would act as an
input and labour is the other input. Instead, in our model, the nal goods
are the intermediate goods of Grossman and Helpman (1990); in another
word, we do not need labour to combine with the products of di¤erent
varieties to produce nal goods like in Grossman and Helpman (1990). The
people would just consume the composite goods of the varieties. As the
intermediate goods are the factors in the nal goods production, then when
more variety created by the economy that has comparative disadvantage
in R&D, more labour would be needed in the nal goods production of the
economy with comparative advantage. As such, labour are drawn away from
the R&D sector of economy with comparative advantage; and since it is a
economy that can contribute more to the knowledge pool of the world, its
fall in R&D labour would be detrimental to the worlds long-run growth.
Also, this result di¤ers from Zeng and Zhang (2007) where they show nu-
merically that there is an subsidy rate that leads to the optimal growth
rate - beyond which the growth rate would fall. This result comes from the
distortionary e¤ect of the tax which funds the subsidy. In their model, they
introduce leisure which means that an income tax would not be equivalent
to a lump-sum tax, causing distortions. Also, their is closed economy but
ours is an open one.
1.4 Special case
Even though we cannot show mathematically that there is a combination
of z1 and z2 that would give a maximum welfare for both economies. We
examine the case where both economies must have the same subsidy rate,
that is z1 = z2 = z; and found out that there is an optimal positive z for
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which we can attain the maximum welfare level for both economies com-
bined. If so, we can increase the welfare of the two economies combined
by providing some positive subsidies to R&D as compared to letting the
economies operate on their own without any subsidies to R&D. Also, we
can claim that over-subsidizing R&D, beyond some level of subsidies, we
would see the welfare starts decreasing. Formalizing the statement, we have
the following Proposition:
Proposition 2:In the case that both economies must have same subsidy
rates - say z1 = z2 = z and H >

1  , there exists an optimal z that would
give highest welfare of the two economies combined.
Proof:









H (1  )  (1  z)
(1  z)+ (1  )
=
H (1  )  (1  z)
1  z
= H   (H + ) (1  z)
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Then the price ratio Px1Px2 or
Px2
Px1
are independent of variable and z: Likewise,
1 and 2 are independent of z (see (1.22)). As such, the second terms in






H   (H + ) (1  z)
1  z

= L1=an1   L1=an1
H
 (1  z)






H   (H + ) (1  z)
1  z

= L2=an2   L2=an2
H
 (1  z)
1  z fH + g
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W1 +W2 = B +
ln ([L1   g1an1] =ax1)
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B and ln f(an1=ax1) (an2=ax2)g are independent of z:
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z  1 + (1  ) 1 (H + ) (1  z)
(1  z) (1  z)2
)
= 0 (1.25)
This would gives us the result:
z = zo =
(1  ) (H + )  
(1  ) (H + )  
The condition H > 1  is enough to show that 0 < zo < 1:
Let:
W =
z  1 + (1  ) 1 (H + ) (1  z)





  (1  ) (H + ) =h








(1  z) (1  z)2
i2




  (1  ) (H + ) =
(1  z) (1  z)2
Since
h
z  1 + (1  ) 1 (H + ) (1  z)
i
when z = zo
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The condition H > 1  also shows that   (1  ) (H + ) = < 0
At z = zo; @W@z < 0; this means
@2(W1+W2)
@z2
< 0. There for W1 + W2 is
maximum at zo:
The result of this special case is interesting in the sense that when subsidy
rates are uniform, both economies can cooperate to choose a subsidy rate
that gives optimal welfare. The questions we want to ask next are as follows.
If we allow the subsidy rates to be di¤erent, how would the two economies
make their choice? Is there any combination of subsidies rates set by the two
economies that produces highest global welfare? We would consider them
in the next section.
1.5 Nash equilibrium and social optimization
1.5.1 Nash equilibrium
What we expect from the model is that for each value of subsidy rate in one
economy, there can be an optimal subsidy rate for the other that gives them
the highest level of welfare. This is intuitive because on the one hand, the
subsidy would help to increase the growth rate but if the subsidy is too high,
too much resource would be devoted to the R&D sector, leading to shortage
of labour in production sector to produce consumption goods. Therefore,
there is a growth e¤ect and consumption e¤ect that works in opposition
directions for an increase in the subsidy rate. To see this mathematically,
we need to go back to the original equilibrium equations to solve for 1 and
g where z1 6= z2 and both are positive.




(1  z1) (g + ) + g (1  )
) L1   1gan1 = L1   L1 (1  ) g
(1  z1) (g + ) + g (1  )
=
L1 (1  z1) (g + )




(1  z2) (g + ) + g (1  )
) L2   2gan1 = L1   L2 (1  ) g
(1  z2) (g + ) + g (1  )
=
L2 (1  z2) (g + )
(1  z2) (g + ) + g (1  ) (1.27)
We know from (1.23) and (1.24):
W1 =



























L1 (1  z1)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Welfare functions (1.28) and (1.29) are very non-linear in z1 and z2 after we
substitute g and 1 solutions into them. We analyse each terms of these two
expressions: As z1 increases, from Proposition 1, we know g increases. The
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L1 (1  z1) (g + )
(1  z1) (g + ) + g (1  )

< 0























1  1 increases. Therefore the second
term of (1.28) can be ambiguous. The last term is positively rated to g so
it would rise if z1 increases.
We know that the two terms of (1.28) make up the level e¤ect. And as z1
approaches 1; the rst term approaches negative innity since the argument
inside the logarithm is approaching zero. This is because if z1 is close to
one, Pxi is too high in relative to the other economys price (refer to (1.15))
and drives down the demand for the goods. If Pxi is too high, the revenue
earned would decrease due to low quantity sold. As z1 approaches 1, E1
would approach zero.6 Thus, there is an optimal z1 that gives an optimal
6Another way to see this is that if z1 approaches 1, we have too many rms wanting
to invest in R&D sector since it almost costs them nothing to enter R&D market. This
drives away people working in the manufacturing sector. So the amount of production is
very small. We expect that the growth e¤ect may dominate positively at rst when z1
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welfare for economy 1. Similarly for economy 2 when z2 increases, we should
expect an optimal z2 given z1 for economy 2. This means that economy i
would respond optimally to subsidy rate z i of the other economy, by setting
zi that would maximize its own welfare. Then each economy would have a
response function to the others policy. The point where these two functions
meet is the Nash equilibrium.
Since time does not allow us to prove rigorously the existence of the two
response functions so thus Nash equilibrium. We resort to numerical ex-
amples to illustrate this point. First we solve for g and 1 in terms of the
parameters and z1 and z2: We substitute them into the welfare functions
(1.28) and (1.29). After that, we di¤erentiate the welfare functions with
respect to the corresponding subsidy rates and let these derivatives be equal
to zeros. We can show numerically then that for di¤erent sets of parameters,
we can nd these rst order conditions gives us best response functions of
z1 in response to a given z2 and vice versa. Denote z1 (z2) be best response
function of z1 to z2; and z2 (z1) of z2 to z1: Here z1 (z2) is the value of z1
that is optimal for economy 1 given the subsidy rate of economy 2, and vice
versa. Numerically we can plot these two curves on the z1   z2 plane. We
plot the best response functions of the two economies, see Figure ...
1.5.2 Social optimum
With the presence of response functions z1 (z2) and z2 (z1) just as discussed
in the Nash equilibrium sub-section7, and together with the fact that if zi
approaches 1 the welfare would decrease so much that it can pulls down the
total welfare of the two economies, we should expect there exists a set of
increases, driving up welfare of economy 1 and beyond some value of z1; the level e¤ect
would dominate negatively and pull down the welfare.
7We cannot show rigorously but we expect that there are response functions, at least
for a wide range of parameter sets.
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subsidy choices adopted by the two economies to give us the highest-possible
total welfare. We would call this the social optimal result.
Though we have studies on how di¤erent policies would a¤ect economies
far as I know, few mention how the policies from di¤erent economies would
interact with each other. There are papers that look at the combinations of
di¤erent kinds of tax and subsidies to achieve the optimal welfare for a closed
economy ( Zeng and Zhang (2007)). In this chapter, the Nash equilibrium
tells us how economies would respond to others policies on subsidy in a
form of game. Here, we address directly the welfare of each economy which
is what matters to an economy, not the growth rate. Furthermore, in this
chapter, we show numerically that there is an optimal set of z1 and z2 that
gives the best welfare for both economies combined. This optimal set is not
the same with the Nash equilibrium. This gives us an interesting insight on
an international cooperation which is discussed in the next section.
1.6 Numerical results and economic policy
Relaxing the condition of two identical economies, we run the simulation
to nd the welfares at di¤erent combination of subsidy rates - z1 and z2-













and L1 > L2; case (v) where an1ax1 >
an2
ax2
and L1 < L2; and
case (vi) where an1ax1 >
an2
ax2
and L1  L2 (where  means "much smaller");
The results presented in Table 1.4 is of case iv:
From all the cases presented we can see that if we keep the subsidy rate of
economy 2 xed at any value and increase the subsidy rate of economy 1.
We note that the welfare of economy 2 may drop at small value of subsidy
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aLn1 = 30; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3;
L1 = 3; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
z1 z2 g W.1 W.2 T.W. 1
0 0 1.050 25.822 47.541 73.363 0.286
0:3 0 1.414 27.242 47.217 74.46 0.353
0:5 0 1.823 27.717 46.935 74.652 0.415
0:75 0 2.759 25.532 46.504 72.036 0.520
0 0:3 1.9301 25.237 48.436 73.672 0.228
0 0:5 3.422 25.376 48.244 73.62 0.168
0 0:75 4.8139 25.983 46.218 72.201 0.138
0.599 0.530 6.074 63.856 42.985 106.84 0.665
0.717 0.627 7.524 63.762 43.877 107.64 0.676
Table 1.1: Case i
rate of economy 1 and then rise at higher value. There are two e¤ects on one
economy when the other increases the subsidy on R&D. First, there would
be more innovations, hence more types of goods produced in economy 1 so
economy 2s expenditure (or income) share is smaller, causing lower welfare.
Second, as economy 1 spend more on subsidy of R&D, there would be more
innovations which contributes to the increase of the world knowledge pool
which in turn increases the overall productivity in economy 2s R&D sector
( _n2 = Ln2(n1+n2)=an2). This second e¤ect will help to increase economy 2s
welfare. So whether economy 2s welfare would increase or decrease depends
on which e¤ect is stronger; this also depends on the productivities in R&D
sectors of both economies and z1: If z1 is large enough, the second e¤ect
might dominate and lead to higher welfare. This shows that the increase in
R&D subsidy in economy 1 would have a positive externalities in term of
knowledge on the other economy.
Meanwhile, economy 1 also enjoys higher welfare due to this R&D-promoting
policy. However, up to a certain subsidy rate, the welfare of economy 1 starts
to decline. This is intuitive because as the economy continues to subsidize its
R&D cost, the price of the goods in this economy would be higher, leading
33
Figure 1.1: Welfare of economy 1 as subsidy rates vary. Parameters: aLn1 =
30; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3; L1 = 3; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
to lower purchase power domestically and thus the local demand for local
goods. The revenue from the rms therefore would start to decline for high
subsidy rate.
If economy 2 subsidizes R&D activities, more innovations would be produced
in economy 2 which adds on to the knowledge pool in the world. This in
turns benets economy 1 now that more knowledge, n, would increase the
productivity in its R&D sector. However, given economy 2 subsidizing its
R&D sector, economy 1 would be better o¤ by choosing some positive R&D
subsidy rate rather than not doing anything. Similarly, economy 1s increase
in subsidy will benet economy 2 for the same reason as discussed above.
Also, there is an optimal rate at which economy 1 attains the highest welfare
for a given subsidy rate in economy 2. As such, we can see clearly that there
is a Nash equilibrium where the best response functions of both economies
would meet. At this point, no economy would wish to deviate because having
lower or higher subsidy rates would mean lower welfare for that economy.
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Figure 1.2: Welfare of economy 2 as subsidy rates vary. Parameters: aLn1 =
30; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3; L1 = 3; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
However, the Nash equilibrium discussed above does not generate the highest
sum of the two economieswelfares. We observe that the equilibrium where
the two response functions meet is the point where both z1 and z2 are
lower than that of the social optimum. The social optimal point here is
dened as the set of z1 and z2 which, if the two economies conform to
set accordingly, would generate highest possible total welfare. To nd the
optimal combination of z1 and z2 that maximizes the total welfare of the two
economies, we nd the rst order conditions for maximizing the sum of two
welfares in (1.28) and (1.29) with respects to z1 and z2. After that we solve
the two rst order conditions for z1 and z2: Given the same parameter set
with Table 1.1, we nd: z1 = 0:717 and z2 = 0:627: With these, the highest
total welfare that can be achieved through R&D subsidies is 107:64, where
economy 1s welfare is 63:762 and economy 2s welfare is 43:877. Whereas,
the Nash equilibrium is where z1 = 0:599 and z2 = 0:530:
If the two economies were to set the R&D subsidy rates on their own, they
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Figure 1.3: Total welfare as the subsidy rate vary. Parameters: aLn1 = 30;
aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3; L1 = 3; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
would naturally set the rates at the Nash equilibrium where they would react
towards each others subsidy policy. Therefore, in order to achieve the social
optimal level, there must be a cooperation from the two economies to set
their respective optimal subsidy rates. Nevertheless, these social optimal
rates are not of any equilibrium, that is there is always an incentive for
any economy to cut its subsidy rate down to its best response given the
other economy abiding to its respective social optimal rate (here the social
optimal outcomes are higher than the Nash equilibrium outcomes for both
economies). Consider the case where one economy faithfully abides to the
social optimal level while the other breaks the agreement and chooses its
best response subsidy rates. Then the former will su¤er the loss in welfare
with respect to its respective social optimal welfare, while the latter will
enjoy higher welfare. But the sum of the two economieswelfares is lower
than that of the social optimal case. That means the loss in the welfare of
the former economy is larger than the gain of the latter one.
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Figure 1.4: Response functions of the two economies. Parameters: aLn1 = 30;
aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3; L1 = 3; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
It is necessary, therefore, to have some kind of agent that can monitor the ac-
tions of the two governments to conform to the social optimal rule. It is nat-
ural for such an agent to enforce a uniform subsidy rate in both economies.
However, the uniform subsidy rate would denitely give lower global welfare
than the social optimal case; the more asymmetric the two economies in
terms of labour endowments or R&D productivity, the higher this di¤erence
would be.
In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2005), since the monopolistic prices are too high,
leading to lower demand as compared to social optimal level, the prices of
intermediate goods should be subsidized in order to restore this. As such, the
social optimal demand of any particular intermediate goods ! is higher than
in the decentralised setting. However, in our model, the optimal demand of
any particular nal goods ! is lower. The question we would wonder then
is whether the monopolistic distortions are endogenously corrected for and
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aLn1 = 24; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3;
L1 = 1:5; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
z1 z2 g W.1 W.2 T.W. 1
0 0 1.092 46.023 42.097 88.119 0.529
0:3 0 1.759 47.744 41.997 89.741 0.604
0:5 0 2.475 48.457 42.279 90.736 0.662
0:7 0 3.625 47.535 43.204 90.739 0.726
0 0.3 1.687 45.904 43.84 89.745 0.453
0 0.5 2.333 46.091 44.544 90.635 0.392
0 0.7 3.377 46.799 43.564 90.363 0.322
0.502 0.502 3.581 49.051 45.125 94.175 0.530
0.511 0.509 3.639 49.104 45.178 94.283 0.474
Table 1.2: Case ii
how they are corrected. Here we have to note that the only input that we
have is labour which is also the only choice we have to make for optimization
problem and is inelastically supplied. Therefore, the optimization problem is
about choosing the right choice of labour for each sector, not on eliminating
the mark-up e¤ect. If we nd the optimal choice of labour used in R&D, the
choice of labour in manufacturing sector would be optimal as well. Also, this
means that the markups due to monopoly pricing do not cause any static
distortion. This corresponds well with the Footnote 11 of Acemoglu, Gancia
and Zilibotti (2010).
From all the results reported in Tables, we nd that if LiaLni (we call this
e¤ective labour of economy i) increases, the subsidy rates that correspond
to Nash equilibrium and social optimum would increase (compare Table 1.2
with Table 1.4; compare Table 1.3 with Table 1.5. Also, as the e¤ective
labour of one economy increases, the subsidy rate that corresponds to Nash
equilibrium and social optimum would increase relatively more than that
of the other economy. For example, from Table 1.3 and Table 1.2, as L1
increases from 1.5 to 3; z1 of Nash equilibrium increases from 0.502 to 0.670
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aLn1 = 24; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3;
L1 = 3; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
z1 z2 g W.1 W.2 T.W. 1
0 0 2.967 62.819 39.65 102.47 0.692
0:3 0 4.172 64.799 40.798 105.60 0.748
0:6 0 6.298 66.568 43.562 110.13 0.809
0:9 0 10.917 59.418 49.793 109.21 0.875
0 0:3 3.513 63.256 41.055 104.31 0.629
0 0:6 4.525 64.19 41.558 105.75 0.538
0 0:9 6.873 66.501 31.768 98.27 0.402
0.670 0.530 8.1018 68.370 46.529 114.90 0.733
0.793 0.644 10.203 68.017 48.541 116.56 0.742
Table 1.3: Case iii
aLn1 = 30; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3;
L1 = 1:5; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
z1 z2 g W.1 W.2 T.W. 1
0 0 0.717 37.295 35.84 73.135 0.474
0:3 0 1.270 38.418 35.136 73.554 0.552
0:6 0 2.296 38.117 34.439 72.556 0.649
0:8 0 3.594 33.903 34.041 67.944 0.724
0 0:3 1.328 36.477 36.818 73.295 0.397
0 0:6 2.451 35.815 36.415 72.231 0.306
0 0:8 3.856 35.665 32.284 67.95 0.238
0.487 0.481 2.878 37.773 36.311 74.084 0.476
0.417 0.392 2.378 37.868 36.326 74.194 0.482
Table 1.4: Case iv
aLn1 = 30; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3;
L1 = 3; L2 = 1;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
z1 z2 g W.1 W.2 T.W. 1
0 0 2.217 60.282 39.025 99.307 0.643
0:3 0 3.211 61.809 39.510 101.32 0.706
0:6 0 4.979 62.648 41.069 103.72 0.776
0:9 0 8.849 53.257 44.723 97.979 0.852
0 0:3 2.778 60.45 40.361 100.81 0.574
0 0:6 3.820 61.03 40.706 101.74 0.478
0 0:9 6.224 62.842 30.537 93.379 0.346
0.500 0.5 3.500 26.899 48.616 75.515 0.286
0.500 0.5 3.499 26.899 48.616 75.515 0.286
Table 1.5: Case v
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aLn1 = 30; aLx1 = 0:4; aLn2 = 18; aLx2 = 0:3;
L1 = 1; L2 = 3;  = 0:7;  = 0:035
z1 z2 g W.1 W.2 T.W. 1
0 0 3.550 31.446 72.964 104.41 0.167
0:3 0 3.875 32.680 73.311 105.99 0.209
0:6 0 4.486 32.963 73.931 106.89 0.279
0:9 0 5.980 22.940 75.294 98.234 0.407
0 0:3 5.121 33.43 75.626 109.06 0.132
0 0:6 7.857 37.852 78.802 116.65 0.0970
0 0:9 13.741 47.423 74.64 122.06 0.0618
0.435 0.742 10.453 42.625 80.613 123.238 0.116
0.535 0.846 12.841 46.037 79.475 125.512 0.109
Table 1.6: Case vi
while corresponding z2 increases from 0.502 to only 0.530. Meanwhile, z1
of social optimum increases from 0.511 to 0.793 while corresponding z2 in-
creases from 0.509 to only 0.644. We observe the same when aLni decreases
(where i = 1 or 2).
For case (iv) and (ii), we see that when the R&D productivity is lowered -
that is, aLn1 increases from 24 to 30; the subsidy rates that correspond to
Nash equilibrium is higher than the respective subsidy rates that correspond
to the social optimum. For all other cases, the reverse is true. We also
examine a special case where both economies are identical to see whether
the choice of social optimal is still higher than the Nash equilibrium. The
parameter set is aLn1 = aLn2 = 12; aLx1 = aLx2 = 0:4; L1 = L2 = 1;
 = 0:65;  = 0:03. The Nash equilibrium choices are z1 = z2 = 0:676;
while the social optimal choices are z1 = z2 = 0:788. We can see that
the choice of subsidy rate in social optimum is higher than that of Nash
equilibrium. However if we lower the productivity of R&D sector by setting
aLn1 = aLn2 = 30 while keeping other parameters the same; then we have
for Nash equilibrium, z1 = z2 = 0:27 while the social optimal choices are
z1 = z2 = 0:496:
40
1.7 R&D subsidy in global trade liberalization
So far we consider a totally free-trade setting. However, if there is some
degree of tari¤, how di¤erent would the policies on R&D subsidy be? Import
price would be higher due to some degree of tari¤. This would make the
demand for the foreign products be less. Overall, all rms su¤er from lower
prots due to lower demand overseas. The R&D subsidy would then be less
e¤ective because with the higher tari¤, the rms would enjoy less prots
from the same cost reduction. Another way to put it is that, if the prots
enjoy by one economys rms are lower, the respective domestic rate of
return would be lower unless there is a subsidy to cut the cost of R&D
(See equation (1.13)). It might be the case that there would be competition
that pushes the R&D subsidies even higher. As such, the Nash equilibrium
and social optimal occur at higher set of R&D subsidies. This results in
ine¢ ciency - welfare loss in both economies. In the WTO negotiation, this
argument can be used as a strong support for lower tari¤ - higher degree of
free trade.
1.8 Conclusion
How one economys policy choice a¤ects the other economy is an interesting
topic and has been discussed well in the North-South setting. In this chap-
ter, we contribute into the literature the analysis of how R&D subsidies in
two economies with similar characteristics (both innovate and produce their
own varieties) will a¤ect each economy. Grossman and Helpman (1990) do
provide some analysis on how R&D subsidies a¤ect global growth. However,
our results di¤er from theirs and we also examine the welfare e¤ect in each
economy.
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Firstly, we nd that an R&D subsidy in either economy will increase the
global growth rate whereas Grossman and Helpman (1990) show in their
model that the subsidy is only benecial if it is from the economy with
comparative advantage in R&D.
Secondly, for uniform subsidy rates - that is, both economies choose the
same subsidy rate, the growth rate would increase and there exists a positive
and nite uniform subsidy rate for which the global welfare (two economies
welfares combined) to be highest.
Thirdly, for non-uniform subsidy choices where each economy will choose its
own R&D subsidy rates that best suits its condition, we nd that there is an
optimal subsidy rate for each economy in response to the other economys
choice of R&D subsidy rate. So the interaction gives us Nash equilibrium
outcomes. However, if two economies cooperate with one another, they will
set di¤erent subsidy rates (social optimal choices) which give highest global
welfare and both are better o¤.
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Many studies on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection focus on the
North-South setting which considers the South (developing) country with
the North (developed) country. The North would innovate whereas the
South would imitate. The main debate centres on whether there should be
more intense IPR or less. Helpman (1993) shows that tighter IPR protection
in the South (that is the South protects the Norths IPRs), in the absence
of foreign direct investment would hurt the South in the terms of trade and
move the manufacturing towards the North. His research identies four
channels through which intellectual property rights a¤ect the economies:
terms of trade; interregional allocation of manufacturing; product availabil-
ity; and R&D investment patterns. Even with the presence of multinational
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companies, the South would still be worse o¤ by tighter IPR protection
because the e¤ects of the terms of trade and reallocation of manufactur-
ing are still present. Meanwhile, it is not clear whether the North benets
from the tighter IPR protection in the South. Helpman (1993) argues that
if the imitation rate is low, the North can benet from this policy due to
the smaller loss in the terms of trade. Meanwhile, Lai (1998) shows that
the rate of innovation would increase with stronger IPR in both the North
and South if the major channel of technological di¤usion is through foreign
direct investment. In contrast, Glass and Saggi (2002), and Glass and Wu
(2007) show that stronger IPR protection in the South leads to a lower rate
of technology transfer; however, the empirical results in Branstetter et al.
(2006) show the opposite.
Furukawa (2007) argues in favour of more relaxed protection in a closed
economy setting with an interesting new factor - accumulative experience in
producing a nal good. Accumulation of experience is obtained by "learning
by experience" through using the intermediate machinery. Thus, if we allow
for tighter IPR protection, there would be more monopolized sectors which
would in turn lead to less production of intermediate goods and thus less
accumulative experience. As a result, the nal good production would be
less productive, and so demand for intermediate goods would be smaller,
causing less incentive for producing new intermediate goods. Also making
use of skill accumulation, Parello (2008) incorporates the skill accumulation
into the North-South model and nds that the tighter IPR would cause a
temporary positive e¤ect on the worldwide innovation rate but hurts the
rate of transfer due to a lower rate of imitation. Meanwhile, in the South,
tighter IPR leads to a decrease in the local level of skill because of less
incentive for individuals to acquire education. Bessen and Maskin (2009)
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look at the sequential and complementary aspects of innovation, by which
they claim that patent protection may reduce overall innovation.1
Theoretical studies show di¤erent results on whether tighter IPR would be
benecial to growth. The natural question is whether there is an optimal
amount of IPR protection. Kwan and Lai (2003) employ a variety-expansion
model to look at how a shock in IPR protection would a¤ect the economic
dynamics, accounting for the loss in consumption level but gain in consump-
tion growth, showing that there is an optimal degree of IPR protection. Even
though the model is a closed economy setting, Kwan and Lai (2003) claim
that their model can be extended to an open economy setting with optimal
degree of IPR protection in a global economy. Olivier and Goh (2002) study
the optimal patent protection in an economy with two sectors - downstream
and upstream. This two-sector feature somewhat is along the same line with
the sequential innovation in Bessen and Maskin (2006). They focus more
on the patent breath which they believe is the more important in practice;
they allow patent length to be unlimited. They nd that tighter protection
in the downstream sector would lower the demand for the upstream thus
the rate of upstream innovation. The growth rate of nal output therefore
would be lower as well. In conclusion, Olivier and Goh (2002) nd that high
IPR protection in the upstream sector and lower degrees of IPR protection
in the downstream sector would be optimal.
Horii and Iwaisako (2007) nd that there should be moderate degree of pro-
tection to generate incentives to innovate. So the long-run growth is "max-
imized by the imperfect" protection of IPRs. Horii and Iwaisako (2007)
construct a quality ladder model to examine the extent that stronger IPR
1Sequential innovations mean that "each successive invention builds in an essential way
on its predecessors" and complementary innovations are that "each potential innovator
takes a di¤erent research line"
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protection would support growth. The new features that they introduce are:
(1) R&D would be easier in competitive sectors where rms would compete
with state-of-the-art goods, whereas in monopolistic settings, apart from the
innovator, other rms cannot produce such goods. (2) The duplication of
innovation can happen because of the time required for the innovation to
be completed. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) also study IPR protection
in the North-South setting and conclude that tighter IPR protection in the
South would increase the rate of technology transfer to the South within
multinational rms, and therefore raises the R&D employment. The wage
gap between the two economies would be reduced and there is also an in-
crease in the Northern innovation rate. Grossman and Lai (2004) construct
a model to study the optimal patent lengths in an open economy where the
world consists of two economies of di¤erent market sizes and productivities
for R&D, which leads to the di¤erence in the optimal patent policies. Our
paper is di¤erent from Grossman and Lai (2004) in the sense that their
model studies the interaction between two economies of similar structures;
whereas, our model species one economy as the source of all original innova-
tions and the other is the follower, whose R&D activities are to standardize
the innovations of the North.
Surveying the literature on IPR, there are di¤erent approaches as to how
to model the IPR protection. Yang and Maskus (2001) model the degree
of IPR protection as how well a policy can help the licensing of technology
from North to South. Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008) consider stronger
IPR protection as an increase in the duration of patents granted to South-
ern imitators. Gancia and Bonglioli (2008) model stronger IPR protection
as percentage of prots that successful Southern imitators have to repatri-
ate to Northern rms. Our IPR protection refers, like that of Dinopoulos
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et al. (2008), to the duration of global patent protection granted to the
respective economies. In our model, the South has to invest in learning the
innovations of the North so as to come out with a technology that can stan-
dardize the process of producing them. Standardization is already discussed
in Acemoglu et al. (2010). This standardization is a kind of innovation for
which the South can apply for patents. Standardization technology helps
manufacturing of the intermediate goods to be more e¢ cient - less labour
required to produce one unit of intermediate goods. Thus, in our paper,
both economies would have their own patent systems that protect their own
goods. The question we want to address here is what the optimal combi-
nation of patent lengths in both economies is so that we can achieve the
highest welfare of the world economy.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we outline the model. The
following section would analyse the equilibrium. Here, we would show the
existence and characteristics of the equilibrium. Section 2.4 will report some
numerical results to show the welfare analysis. The conclusions would be in
Section 2.5.
2.2 Model
The model is similar to the endogenous growth model with variety expan-
sion in Segerstrom and Gustafsson (2011). In their paper, when innovations
are produced in the North, they are facing the risk of being imitated by the
South. If the products are imitated, they will be produced by the South
and the rms that own the imitated products would enjoy the monopoly
power over the products forever. Acemoglu et al. (2010) view this progress
of transfer of technologies in a di¤erent manner. In their paper, there are
high-tech and low-tech rms where the high-tech rms would innovate and
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the low-tech rms would learn how to standardize the products. After stan-
dardizing, the products would be sold at the monopoly prices set by the
low-tech rms if the new price is lower than the price set by the high-tech
rms. The shift from innovated products to standardized products does have
an attractive feature. In our paper, there are also two economies, North and
South, where the North innovates and the South standardizes the products
that are not yet standardized. However, we introduce intellectual property
right protection through the patent system where products are protected for
some period of time. The South can only start standardizing the products
that are no more under patents in the North. Also, when the South manage
to standardize the products, the South rms also receive patent protections
for the standardizations. The standardization can be understood as mak-
ing the productions of the goods much faster and convenient. After the
standardization patents are expired in the South, the goods would be under
perfect competition and charged at marginal cost. Therefore the product
cycle has three phases: innovation, standardization and perfect competition.
This model has two economies- North and South; and the only input factor is
labour which is spent in two activities or two sectors: manufacturing product
varieties and producing R&D. Labour cannot move from one economy to the
other but is allowed to move across the sectors within an economy. Within
an economy, there is not di¤erence in wage for all workers as labour market
are competitive. The workers in the Norths R&D sector focus only on
innovative research activities while the workers in the Souths R&D sector




Both economies have a xed number of households, Liwhere i = N;S. Each
individual of the household supplies inelastically one unit of labour. The
income of each household comes from wages and assets from the shares
in rms. Similar to Segerstrom and Gustafsson (2011), we assume that
only households in economy ihold the share of the rms in economy i. Let
Eitdenote the representative consumers expenditure in economy iat time t:
Households in both economies have identical preferences. Each will maxi-




e t ln [uit] dt (2.1)
where  is the discount rate and uit is the static utility of the representative









where 0 <  < 1 and xit (!) denotes the product variety ! consumed by the
households in economy i at time t; nt is the number of product varieties in
the world market. Here,  denotes the degree of product di¤erentiation, the
elasticity of substitution between the product varieties is 11  = :
The demand function for each variety, denoted as xit (where i represents the








i=N;S Eit is the total expenditure of both economies combined;








price index. Maximizing the total utility (2.1) with respect to the static
utility (2.2) with xit (!) is given as in (2.3), we get the Euler-condition:
_Et
Et
= rt    (2.4)
The Euler condition implies that the growth of the expenditure is the dif-
ference between the rate of returns and the discount rate.
2.2.2 Product markets
The aim of the rms would be to maximize their prots through setting
prices. Assume that to produce each unit of nal goods, each economy
would need bi units of labour. The prot function of each rm can be
written as follow:





















where pmSt is the monopolistc price set by the South, pNt is the price set by
the North, wSt (wNt) is the wage in the South (North).
Note that due to symmetry, the monopolistic prices of all nal goods in the
North (South) would be the same at any point in time. When the prod-
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uct variety is no more under the Norths patent protection, the product is
available for the South to standardize and subjects to the Souths patent
protection. If the marginal cost or bNwNt is higher than or equal to the
monopolistic price of the South, the South can set the price at bSwSt=,
that means the price setting is not binding. However if bNwNt < bSwSt= <
bNwNt=, then it is better for the North to undercut the price to a little bit
below bSwSt= and still make some prot. The South then in return should
set its adjusted price to pmSt = bNwNt, that is limit pricing. When the stan-
dardized product variety in the South is no more under patent protection,
it is sold at marginal cost or the competitive price. The competitive price
is given as follows:
pcSt = bSwSt (2.9)
where pcSt is the competitive price in the South.
For some sets of parameters, we would have limit pricing and for others, we
have monopoly price setting. So if we vary the values of patent lengths in the
South (TS) and in the North (TN ), we may have two regimes. However, in
our numerical results, we only focus on the parameters that give us monopoly
prices for all values of TS and TN : Also, the mathematical derivations of
the equilibrium conditions and welfare functions under the limit pricing are
reported in the Appendix C.
2.2.3 Innovation and standardization
In order to innovate and develop a new product variety, a rm in the North
needs to use aN
Nt
units of labour, where aN is the Norths innovative R&DK
productivity parameter, KNt is the knowledge pool that is useful for the 
North in the process of innovation. Here we let the inter-temporal knowl-
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edge spill-over to be perfect and KNt = nt, that is the knowledge stock
consists of all of the varieties developed from the past till present. De-
note the amount of labour employed in the R&D sector of the North to be
LRNt, the number of innovations that are produced at any point in time is





Similarly, the Southern rm would have to use aSKSt units of Southern labour
to learn how to standardize a randomly chosen variety from the North, where
aS is the Souths innovative R&D productivity parameter, KSt is the knowl-
edge pool that is useful for the South in the process of innovation. We would
consider three cases of KSt : (1) KSt = nte gTN   nSt ; (2) KSt = nte gTN ;
(3) KSt = nt: The rst case means that only innovations available to be
standardized - that is, innovations that have already expired but not yet
standardized by the South - are useful for standardization process. The sec-
ond case means that only those innovations that have expired are available
and useful to the standardization process. This can be understood that if
the innovations are still under patent protection, the knowledge of these
innovations cannot be learnt. Alternatively, it might be the case that even
though the knowledge of not-yet-expired products might be known but they
are not important for the standardization process of the expired products.
The third case means that all innovations from the past to the present are
useful to the standardization process - under this assumption, whenever an
innovation is born in the North, the Southern rms would be able to learn
of it immediately and use it in the standardization process. However, the
Southern rms can only standardize the products that have already expired.
Our main focus is on the rst case and we will present the next two cases
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in a separate section.
Though we focus on the rst case, it does not mean that the other two are
of less important. The analytical and numerical results for the other two
cases are more or less similar to that of the rst case. For the rst case, we
stress more on the knowledge pool as the target base that the South rms
can pick any innovations that are available to be standardize from and carry
out the standardization on them. This means that the R&D productivity of
the South purely depends on the e¤ective labour LS=aS and not on the how
much knowledge they know or accumulate (mathematically, later, we can
see that the standardization rate of the South for this case purely depends
on e¤ective labour).
There is another possibility for forth case where we can have a knowledge
pool which has di¤erent weights on the in-patent innovations and patent-
expired innovations, and contributes to the R&D productivity of the South.
The result for this case would be in between the second and the third case.





Here the rate at which new products are standardized in the South depends
on the e¤ective labour used in the R&D sector, LRStaS ; and the knowledge
pool that the South has KSt:
2.2.4 No-arbitrage condition
The static prot for a representative rm in the North whose product variety
is not yet copied is Nt. When the patent protection is over, the Northern
rm will face the ongoing risk of losing its monopoly power when a rm in the
South manages to learn to standardize its product. During any time interval
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dt, when the patent has already expired, the probability for a Northern rm
to give up its product is _nSdt=(nte gTN  nSt) where g is the growth rate of
number of product variety, TN is the patent length of the North (the period
during which the Northern product is protected). At the point when the
successful standardization occurs, the rm will lose its value, Nt: However,
during the time that the standardization has not yet occurred, the rm will
continue to receive _VNt during the time interval dt: The stock markets in
both economies are assumed to be able to completely diversify the risks
faced by the households when they invest their savings into the rms. The
R&D sectors in both the North and the South are assumed to be perfectly
competitive. So, we impose a no-arbitrage condition within each economy
and across economies. We would rst discuss the former.
No arbitrage in the North
A rm in the North enjoys the ow of prots for two periods of time: the
rst is the duration of the patent protection and the second is from the time
that the patent expires till the time the product variety is standardized. The
ow of prots of the rst is certain, but that of the second is uncertain as
the rm would not know when the standardization occurs. Thus, the value
of a rm in the North at time of being innovated is the sum of discounted
ows of prots in these two periods. We have:
VNt (!) = VN1t + e










rNtVN2t = Nt + _VN2t   tVN2t
) VN2t = Nt +
_VN2t
rNt + t
where rN is the interest rate of the North in steady state, and t is the






market is competitive, we have VNt = CNt, where CNt is the R&D cost of








The R&D cost is the wage paid to the labour employed in the R&D sector
to produce one innovation.
In steady state, the cost of R&D is constant so _CNt = _CSt = 0 which
means _VNt = 0 and _VN2t = 0 (Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1990)).
Therefore, in steady state, N , rN and  would be constant at all time and


















No arbitrage in the South
In contrast, a rm in the South only enjoys the prot ows when its patent
protection is still valid. After that, the product variety will be competitive.
The rm will continue to produce this product at zero prot. The value of






t rSdS (!) d (2.15)
where rS is the interest rate of the South, TS is the patent length of the









where CS is the R&D cost of standardizing a product variety. From now
on, we would drop the time subscript whenever no confusion can arise.
Labour market
Labour markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive and the workers in
each economy are allowed to move from one sector to the other. Therefore
within an economy, there is only one wage which would adjust instanta-
neously so that the labour market always clears. In the North, labour is
employed in two sectors: production and research. Each innovation needs
aN
KN
units of labour, each unit of product variety requires bN units of North-
ern labour and there are nN (= n  nS) number of varieties to produce.
Let LN be the amount of labour available in the North, the labour-market
clearing condition would be:





In the South, labour is employed in production of standardized product
varieties and R&D activities to learn how to standardize and develop a
product from the North. Each innovation needs aSKS units of labour, each
unit of product variety requires bS units of Southern labour. Let LS be




1  e gTSxmS + bSnSe gTSxcS + aSKS _nS (2.18)
We can see from the expression above that nS
 
1  e gTS is the number
of product varieties in the South that are still under patent protection and
nSe
 gTS is that of those whose patents have already expired.
2.3 Steady-state equilibrium
We solve the model for the steady-state equilibrium by imposing the no-
arbitrage condition across the two economies, in the sense that the interest
rates of the two economies are the same. Also, all the endogenous variables
grow over time at corresponding constant rates. In the end, we will reduce
the number of equilibrium conditions to two with two unknowns -  and g
(the growth rate of number of product varieties):
At the steady state equilibrium, we have nS ; nN and n to grow at the same
rate, g; that is _nSnS =
_nN
nN
= _nn = g: That is to say that the shares of varieties
of each economy (nSn and
nN














n in terms of
















The rst expression is derived using the fact that only those product varieties
whose patents have expired (that is, ne gTN ) are available to be standardized
and that  = _nS
ne gTN nS :
Now let us look at the equilibrium condition in the North. At steady state
equilibrium, rN = rS = r:








r (r + ) erTN
(erTN   1) (r + ) + r (2.20)
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r (r + ) erTN








r (r + ) erTN











+ g  H (g; )
where lN  LN
aN
(2.21)
Now let us look at the equilibrium condition in the South. First, we would
look at the case where KS = ne gTN   nS : Later on, we would examine the
other two cases, where KS = ne gTN and KS = n:
2.3.1 Monopolistic price setting
If bSwsbNwN < 1; the monopolistic price of the South is still lower than the


















since xc2 = 
 xm2 (2.23)














As mentioned earlier, we examine the case for KS = ne gTN   nS . Let
lS  LSaS .
















1  e gTS +  e gTS (g + ) 
















The two equations (2.21) and (2.25) determine the steady state  and g.
Before we show the existence, uniqueness and properties of the equilibrium,
we need to have the following ve lemmas. Lemma 3 and Lemma 5 show
that  is positively related to g in the two equations (2.21) and (2.25).
Lemma 1: J (g; TN ) =
 + e gTN   g + geTN   0 for all TN :
Proof: J (g; 0) = 0:
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J2 (g; TN ) =  ge gTN + geTN = g

eTN   e gTN  > 0 for TN > 0:
Lemma 2:
Let ^ (g) be a function of g:
Given:




1  ^ (g) e
 gTN




+g   lN ; (2.26)




g (g + ) egTN
^ (g)

+ 2e2gTN + 2egTNTNg + e
gTNTN > 0
Proof: Let  (g) = ^(g)e
 gTN
^+g and  (g) =
^(g)e (g+)TN
^(g)+g+ and B (g) =
1 (g)
1 (g) :
From equation (2.21), we have:
B0 (g) =











Now if we have 0 (g) < 0 (g) ; 0 (g) < 0 and 1 (g)1 (g) > 1; then B
0 (g) > 0
First, we have: Let ge
gTN
(g) = f (g) : So  (g) =
1
egTN+f(g)








1   (g)   1 =
   1  e TN  (1 + f (g)) g   f (g) 
(1 + f (g)) (egTN g + egTN f (g) + egTN f (g) g   ge TN )
< 0
) 1   (g)
1   (g) < 1)
1   (g)
1   (g) > 1
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If f 0 (g) > 0, we have:
0 (g)  0 (g)
=  TNe
gTN + f 0 (g)
(egTN + f (g))2
+
TNe







gTN + f 0 (g)
eTN (egTN + f (g))2
+
TNe












2 + 2f (g)2 e2gTN + egTNTNf (g)
2 + f 0 (g) gf (g)2
f 0 (g) f (g)2 + f (g)3 +

f (g) e2gTN   f 0 (g) ge2gTN + 2e2gTNTNgf (g)
	o
Note that:
f (g) e2gTN   f 0 (g) ge2gTN + 2e2gTNTNgf (g)
=
 
















f (g)2 + 2e2gTNTNgf (g)






= f (g)2 0 (g) egTN   e2gTNTNgf (g) + 2e2gTNTNgf (g)





2f (g)2 e2gTN + f 0 (g) gf (g)2 + f 0 (g) f (g)2 + f (g)3
i
(egTN + f (g))2 (egTN + f (g) g + f (g) )2
> 0
then we have 0 (g)  0 (g) < 0:
We have:
2f (g)2 e2gTN + f 0 (g) gf (g)2 + f 0 (g) f (g)2 + f (g)3
= f (g)2
 








ff (g) (g + )g+ 2egTN + 2egTNTNg + egTNTN

So if ddg ff (g) (g + )g+2egTN+2egTNTNg+egTNTN > 0; we have ddg [F (g; ^ (g))] >
0:
Lemm 3: The condition (2.21) has the property: @@g > 0
Proof: To prove Lemma 3, we need to use two lemmas - Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2










eTN   1+ g2 2eTN   1+
2g2

2eTN   1+ g3 eTN   1+ g2eTN
9>=>;
  
1   (g + ) e
(g+)TN  2 geTN   g   + e TN	
Note that

eTN   1  0 and from Lemma 1, we also see that geTN   g  
+ e TN  0: Therefore, we can show that that H2 (g; ) < 0:
The proof for @H(g;)@g > 0 can be inferred directly from the proof of Lemma
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2. That is, if we treat  to be independendent of g then ^ (g) is independent
of g: This means ^0 (g) = 0:







dg fF (g; ^ (g))g > 0 where F (g; ^ (g)) is that of equation (2.26). But





> 0 is certain. That means
H1 (g; ) > 0:
So we have H1 (g; ) > 0 and H2 (g; ) < 0, this means that for equation
(2.21), ddg > 0 for any value  > 0 and g > 0.










(g + ) (g + + ) e(g+)TN 
e(g+)TN   1 (g + + ) + g +  + g
)  = ~ (g)
If TN increases, we would have ~ (g) to pivot inwards around the point
0; LNaN (1  )  











(g + ) (g + + ) e(g+)TN 










1   e (g+)TN  = (g + + ) + g





1 (e (g+)TN )=(g++) + g  
LN
aN










Note that  is a given value so therefore independent of g: Thus g(g+)e
gTN

is increasing in g: So we can be sure that F1 (g; ) > 0:
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Now rewrite F (g; ) as:







(g + ) (g + + )
g + + 
 







g + + 
 
1  e (g+)TN  (g + ) (g + + )+ g + g   LNaN










1  e rTN ge gTN   g +   1  e gTN re rTN










1  e rTN   re TN g +   1  e gTN 	






gr + g  ge rTN   gre TN   re TN + re rTN	






gr + g  gre TN   ge TN   e TN + e rTN	








1  e TN + e TN  geTN   g   + e gTN 	
g + + 
 
1  e (g+)TN 	2





> 0: That is to
say @F (g;)@TN > 0: Since
@F (g;)
@g > 0; we can see that if TN increases, g would
decrease for a given . That is to say the graph of ~ (g) would pivot inwards
when TN increases.











e gTS   e gTS   e (g+)TS 
1  e (g+)TS2 < 0
So the right-hand side of (2.25) is decreasing in g: Also, the left-hand side of
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(2.25), lS ; is decreasing in . The graph of  against g that satises (2.25)
is upward-sloping.
As g !+ 0 ,  !+ 0. As g ! 1;  !  lS (1  ) : (Here !+ means
"approaching from the right" and !  means "approaching from the left".)
Proposition 6: The equilibrium is unique if the following condition is met:
Condition 1:
lN (1  )   > Z








2g +   g
(g + )2
  (





















1  e gTS +  e gTS (g + ) 
1  e (g+)TS + g
)  = ^ (g) (2.28)
And




1  ^ (g) e
 gTN




+ g   lN
Following Lemma 2, we have:
d





+ 2egTN + 2egTNTNg+ e
gTNTN > 0:
We have









1  e gTS +  e gTS 
1  e (g+)TS (g + )2 egTN + g (g + ) egTN
)
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(1 e (g+)TS ) (g + )































1  e gTS +  e gTS (g + )2 TNegTN 
1  e (g+)T 
+g (g + )TNe



























1  e (g+)TS + (g + )TSe (g+)TS
o
+g (g + )TNe
gTN + 2lSe
gTN + gegTN + (g + ) egTN
Now if we let (g + )TS = x, then

e (g+)TS + (g + )TSe (g+)TS

= e x+





1  e gTS +  e gTS egTN 
1  e (g+)T  n1  e (g+)TS + (g + )TSe (g+)TSo > 0
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9=;
+g (g + )TNe
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9=;
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=   (TN )
So as long as we have   (TN ) > 0 for all TN then we can show that
d
dg fF (g; ^ (g))g > 0:
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1A lS (1  )+ (g + ) + (+ 2g) (1  )
(g + )2
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1A lS (1  ) + 2g +   g
(g + )2
  (














Also, we can clearly see that  0 (TN ) > 0; so if   (0) > 0 then   (TN ) > 0:
So now, the next step is to see if   (TN ) > 0
Let:







2g +   g
(g + )2
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 (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(g + )2
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 (










































So there are the following cases of  (g) : (1) increasing in g or (2) decreasing
in g or (3) has one minimum point or (4)one maximum point only for g > 0:
However, we have  (g ! 0+) =  1 (because  > 0) and  (g !1+)! 0:
That means only cases 1 and 4; are relevant, and for both cases,  (g) = 0
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only has maximum one root. Let this root be ~g; we know that for g > ~g;
 (g) > 0: There exists a Z such that ^ (Z) = 0 and ^ (g) > 0 for all g > Z:
The lowest possible value of g is lN (1  ) : The condition that we need
for ddg fF (g; ^ (g))g > 0 is:
Condition 1:
lN (1  )   > Z








2g +   g
(g + )2
  (














Now we need to show that F (g; ^ (g)) = 0 has only one root by showing the
conditions: F (lN (1  )  ; ^ (lN (1  )  )) < 0 and F (1; ^ (1))!
1 and Fg (g; ^ (g)) > 0:
At g = lN (1  )  , we have the solution for  to the equation (2.25) is
positive since ^ (Z) = 0 and lN (1  )    > Z ; call this solution value
, meanwhile if g = lN (1  )   ; the equation (2.21) produces  = 0
or ^ (lN (1  )  ) = 0: As such, if we substitute  into  of F (g; ) we
would have a negative value for F (g; ) ; this is because F2 (g; ) < 0: So
F (lN (1  )  ; ) < 0:
Also F (1; ^ (1))!1:Thus, if the conditions 1 is satised, F (g; ^ (g)) = 0
has only one root. That is, the condition gives us one solution and the
equilibrium is unique. 
The condition of Proposition 6 is the su¢ cient but not necessary. Here, this
condition means that the e¤ective labour in the North has to be su¢ ciently
big in order for equilibrium to exist where both economies operate. Now,
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we would look at the properties of this equilibrium in Proposition 7 and
Proposition 8.
Properties of the equilibrium
Proposition 7 examines how the e¤ective labour in each economy would
a¤ect the equilibrium, mainly  and g:
Proposition 7: (i) @@lS > 0 and
@g
@lS




Proof: (i) Let the graph that follows equation (2.25) be  = ^ (g) ; we also
have the graph that follows equation (2.21) as  =  (g) :If we have lS to
increase, then in graph  = ^ (g) ; for a given g, we would have higher  .
This would mean that ^ (g) would pivot upwards around the origin, cutting
 (g) at higher g and higher : This is because  (g) is also increasing in
g: (ii) If we have lN to increase, then in graph  =  (g) ; for a given g,
we would have higher ; because H1 (g; ) > 0 . This would mean that
 (g) would shift to the right, cutting ^ (g) at higher g and higher : This
is because ^ (g) is also increasing in g:
Proposition 7 is intuitive because more e¤ective labour there is in the South
might mean the productivity of R&D (standardization) sector in the South
is higher, meaning lower aS , or there is larger labour supply, LS . Both cases
lead to a higher standardization rate. This means that more products whose
patents are expired would be standardized by the South, thus releasing more
labour in the North to the R&D sector. As we know,the R&D sector is
the source of growth - the amount of labour working in this sector would
determine the growth rate of the world.
Next, Proposition 8 examines how the patent lengths will a¤ect the equilib-
rium.
Proposition 8: (i) @@TN < 0 and
@g
@TN





Figure 2.1: Labour-clearing condition graphs of Case 1
Proof: (i) If we have TN to increase, then for a given , we would have
lower g; because of Lemma 4 . This would mean that  (g) would pivot
leftwards around the point

0; LNaN (1  )  

, cutting  (g) at lower g
and lower : This is because ^ (g) is also increasing in g: (ii) If TS increases,
in the graph ^ (g) ; for a given g, if TS increases,  will increase because 
1  e gTS +  e gTS =  1  e rTS is decreasing in TS . This means the
graph ^ (g) will pivot leftwards or upwards around the origin. In this case, g
increases and  increases because ^ (g) and  (g) are both upward-sloping.
As TN increases, this means that more innovations would be under patents
and are not subject to being standardized by the South. More labour in the
North then would be spent on producing nal goods and less on innovations.
The world economy, thus, would grow at smaller rate. With same reasoning
as Proposition 8, the standardization rate is smaller.
As TS increases, this means that more standardized products would be un-
der patents and are not competitive goods. If the products are under perfect
competition, more of a product would be produced because the price is com-
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petitive, so lower. As less Souths standardized products expire, less labour
in the South would be spent on producing nal goods that are under perfect
competition and more labour for standardization.The standardization then
is higher as TS increases. If more products are standardized by the South,
less labour in the North would be spent on producing the nal goods at
the benet of having more labour for the R&D sector of the North. So the
growth rate would be higher.
The growth-maximizing combination of TN and TS is that TN = 0 and TS =
1: However, we will less likely have TN = 0 for welfare-maximizing for the
North. TN = 0 scenario can happen if the productivity of standardization
or the amount of labour in the South is very small because then the small
standardization rate means that rms in the North can enjoy some period
of time before its innovations is transferred to the other economy. So the
welfare-maximizing value for TN might be zero. For a reasonable set of
parameters, we observe the welfare-maximizing TN to be nite and greater
than zero.
So far, we have examined how the growth rate and the standardization rate
are a¤ected by changes in e¤ective labours and patent lengths. Now, we
would look at how the welfare would respond to the parameters and patent
lengths.
Welfare e¤ects of patents The welfare function of the North under
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With KS = ne gTN   nS ; we have:
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US =




































(  1) 2 (2.31)
For the welfare analysis, we resort to numerical analysis to study how the
patent lengths would a¤ect the welfare of each economy. From (2.47) in




vary and for some sets of values of TN and TS , the ratio can be less than
one. For numerical results, we record down only results for the case in which
the parameters guarantee monopoly pricing. Here, we would examine which
combination of TN and TS would give us the highest global welfare. From
Table 2.1, we can see that as TN increases, the growth rate would fall which
is consistent with Proposition 8 part (i). However the e¤ect of increase TN on
the welfare of the North is ambiguous. At rst the Norths welfare rises but
beyond TN = 7, the welfare starts to decrease. The intuition for this is that
there are two o¤setting e¤ects: consumption e¤ect and growth e¤ect. As TN
increases, the Norths rms would enjoy longer period of monopoly which
might help them enjoy higher income - thus, higher static consumption - for
small change in TN when TN is small. However, if more innovations remain
in the North and more labour would be required in the manufacturing sector
and less to be in the R&D sector. That is the reason why we see that for
higher TN ; the growth rate drops. So depending on which e¤ect dominates,
we have the corresponding direction for welfare. For some lower range of TN ;
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consumption e¤ect dominates the growth e¤ect for a small positive change
in TN ; but for higher range of TN ; growth e¤ect dominates the consumption
e¤ect for a positive change in TN : This results is similar to closed economy
welfare analysis.
Increases in TN would be detrimental to the welfare of the South because
less innovations would be produced in the North (lower growth rate) and
also the longer the patent length, less number of innovations would expire
at any point in time for the South to legally learn to standardize it.
Meanwhile, if TS increases, we nd that the growth rate, g, would increase.
In contrast to the e¤ect of TN on the growth rate, increase in TS here
would lead to higher rate of standardization in the South for the case KS =
ne gTN   nS : This is because the longer the patent in the South, the more
protable for rms to standardize products from the North. As such more
labour would be devoted to this standardization process. At the same time,
if the standardized products in the South is under monopolistic pricing,
the quantity demanded for those products would be less, thus requiring less
labour in the manufacturing sector and more labour can be channelled to the
standardization process (Souths R&D sector). When more standardizations
occur in the South, the North would lose more of its innovation to the South.
But this loss would release the labour in manufacturing to R&D activities,
causing the growth rate, g, to be higher.
There are also two opposing e¤ects on welfare caused by increase in TS .
First, the consumers would not be able to enjoy as many products with the
lower competitive price if TS increases - this would mean lower consumer
surplus. The second but opposing e¤ect is that as TS increases, g is higher,
meaning more innovations would be churned out in the world and the pool
of innovations that can be targeted for standardization is larger. This means
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that consumers can enjoy from the variety. From the numerical results, we
can see that the second e¤ect, or growth e¤ect, dominates the rst in term
of welfare. The North welfare and South welfare are positively related to TS
and the welfare maximizing TS is innite.
Next, we would study how the growth rate, the standardization rate and
the welfares would respond to the changes in parameters.
Sensitivity analysis: Table 2.2 gives us the overall picture of how the
variations in the parameters would a¤ect the growth rate, standardization
rate and the welfare of the two economies. As  increases from 0.35 to 0.4,
the growth rate and imitation rate are reduced. This is because smaller ;
the higher the mark-up of the monopolistic price. Firms would enjoy higher
prot and thus would invest more into researching. Research productivity
of the North, 1aN , is positively related with g and : If aN is higher, this
means more labour needed to produce one unit of innovation in the North
and we can see that if aN increases from 12 to 16, g would fall from 4.90
to 3.45. Less innovations would mean less standardization activities in the
South too. Welfares of both economies would thus drop too. Likewise, the
productivity of R&D of the South, 1aS , is positively related to g and : For
a higher aS , the productivity of R&D in the South is lower and thus the
standardization rate. However if the standardization process is slowed in
the South, more products would be still produced in the North, taking up
labour in the North for manufacturing and less labour would be available
in the Norths R&D sector. That is why the growth rate decreases. In the
same manner, welfares of both economies are lower.
It is interesting that the productivities of manufacturing in both economies





bS = 0:3  = 0:3 aS = 18 LS = 1:2  = 0:04
bN = 1 aN = 14 LN = 1 TN = 5 TS = 10
Parameters Growth (%) Std. rate (%) Ss Welfare Ns Welfare
Benchmark parameters results
4.076 1.278 46.119 42.557
Alternative parameters results
TN = 1 4.09 1.28 50.55 42.34
TN = 3 4.08 1.28 48.34 42.48
TN = 5 4.076 1.278 46.12 42.55
TN = 7 4.068 1.275 43.912 42.577*
TN = 10 4.053 1.271 40.638 42.526
TN = 12 4.042 1.268 38.486 42.453
TN = 15 4.025 1.263 35.31 42.299
TN = 17 4.014 1.259 33.231 42.175
TN = 20 3.997 1.254 30.169 41.968
TS = 5 3.929 0.490 26.369 40.013
TS = 9 4.000 0.832 37.751 41.119
TS = 13 4.053 1.137 43.948 42.093
TS = 19 4.114 1.539 49.398 43.445
TS = 25 4.160 1.887 52.751 44.667
TS = 29 4.184 2.094 54.383 45.401
TS = 35 4.214 2.369 56.285 46.372
TS = 39 4.230 2.531 57.298 46.933
TS = 43 4.244 2.677 58.16 47.431
Table 2.1: Case i with e¤ects of di¤erent patent lengths
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Mathematically, bN and bS do not enter the equations (2.25), (2.51) and
(2.21) that determine the equilibrium. The intuition for this is that the
amount of quantity demanded of one variety is inversely proportional to the
amount of labour to produce one unit of nal goods. As such, changing the
productivity of manufacturing does not change the amount of labour spent
in manufacturing and thus no change to the amount of labour spent in R&D
sectors. So the growth rate or standardization rate would remain the same.
However, the amount of quantity demanded for one variety in respective
economy is proportionally smaller as bN or bS gets bigger. Therefore the
consumers would su¤er if bN or bS gets bigger, as reected in Table 2.2.
The analysis of change of Li is discussed in Proposition 7 and Proposition
8. As for the increase in ; we cannot see clearly how  would a¤ect the
welfare, growth rate and standardization rate mathematically due to the
non-linearity. However, increase in  in general would lead to lower welfare
because the people are less patient in consuming. Impatience results in more
spending on consumptions in static, which means more labour are devoted
to manufacturing and less on innovating and standardizing activities.
Results 1: There is an optimal TN which maximises the Norths welfare
for a given TS :
Results 2: The longer the patent length set by the South, that is higher
Ts; the higher the welfare levels for both economies. So it is optimal for the
South to protect the products forever.
Result 2 seems to be strange at the rst sight when the literature, as
far as we are aware, supports nite patent length. However, our model is
an open economy setting where production would ow from the innovating
economy to the other once the standardization occurs. Most of the research
done so far is on the closed economy or open economy with the follower as
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imitator (not as an standardizer). Therefore, the patent discussed e¤ec-
tively is that of one economy. However, here, we have two di¤erent kinds
of patents. Later on, we do discuss the case of uniform patent length - that
is, both North and South must follow one patent length; then, the analysis
would be like that of a closed economy. We nd that the optimal uniform
patent length is nite, consistent with the ndings in the literature.
The rationale behind why optimal TS is innite is due to the resource
allocation. Here the resource is labour. If we allow for some of the products
to be competitively priced in the South, more of it would be produced and
more labour thus would be spent on these competitive products. Thus
less would be spent on how to standardized the patent-expired products
from the North. In that case, more products, whose patents, though, have
been expired, are still produced in the North, taking away the labour that
otherwise can be spent in R&D sector and can produce more innovations.
Therefore, allowing more competitive products in the South would a¤ect the
growth rate of innovations which capture the dynamic e¢ ciency of the global
economy. On the other hand, more competitive products would produce
higher static e¢ ciency - people enjoy more from low prices. However, the
dynamic e¢ ciency in this case always overwhelm the static e¢ ciency in this
particular setting. It might be because of the model setting where labour is
the only factor and is exogenously and inelastically given.
Now we would look at a special case where both economies are forced to
have the same patent length for all the products.
2.4 Uniform patent for rst case
Now we consider uniform patent for the two economies for the rst case





bS = 0:3  = 0:3 aS = 18 LS = 1:2  = 0:04
bN = 1 aN = 14 LN = 1 TN = 5 TS = 10
Parameters Growth (%) Std. rate (%) Ss Welfare Ns Welfare
Benchmark parameters results
4.076 1.278 46.119 42.557
Alternative parameters results
 = 0:35 3.54 0.99 32.647 27.818
 = 0:4 3.00 0.75 24.07 17.929
aN = 12 4.90 1.52 55.459 54.433
aN = 16 3.45 1.09 39.147 33.706
aS = 16 4.1 1.45 48.986 42.501
aS = 20 4.05 1.14 43.463 42.526
bN = 0:9 4.08 1.28 47.347 44.764
bN = 1:1 4.08 1.28 45.133 40.629
bS = 0:2 4.08 1.28 51.946 44.454
bS = 0:4 4.08 1.28 42.209 41.362
LN = 0:9 3.58 1.13 39.457 33.327
LN = 1:1 4.57. 1.43 52.78 51.645
LS = 1:1 4.06 1.17 42.831 42.222
LS = 1:3 4.09 1.39 49.175 42.876
 = 0:03 4.31 1.42 93.189 87.168
 = 0:05 3.83 1.15 25.531 23.654
Table 2.2: Case i with parameterssensitivity analysis
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TN = TS = T: Therefore, the equilibrium equations for the two economies
in non-limit-pricing regime are given as follows:
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(2.34)
Consider now the case where we have T increases, we have ^ (g) to pivot
inwards around the point

0; LNaN (1  )  

and  (g) will pivot upwards
around the origin. Since both graphs are upward-sloping, we cannot be sure
how g and  will behave - they can be higher or lower, depending on which
graph has a greater e¤ect.
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If T = 0, from (2.32),  is necessarily zero. In another word, there is no
standardization activity in the South because there is absolutely no prot
for the South rms. In this case, the labour in the North cannot be released
to move to the R&D sector. Thus if we increase T to some positive value, we
would nd that there would be some standardization activities in the South
and g would increase since more labour in the North can join R&D sectors.
However, if T is too small, the R&D activity in the South can be little.





where g is increasing in T . If T goes beyond T ; g would start to decline
with the lower limit LNaN (1  )    where T is innite. When T ! 1,
there is no economic activity in the South and g = LNaN (1  )  , which
is actually the same with that of when T = 0. To have innite patent length
for the Norths product thus is also not desirable for the growth maximizing.
Therefore, we can say that the growth-maximizing T is nite and positive,
T :
Meanwhile we cannot know exactly how  would behave as T increases
because both  (g) and ^ (g) are both upward sloping and when T in-
creases, ^ (g) pivots inwards around the point

0; LNaN (1  )  

and
0; LNaN (1  )  

shifts upwards.
The welfare of the North should have a maximum for some value of T: The
reason is that for low enough value of T or high enough value of T; the
standardization activity in the South would be very slow. For low T; the
prot in the South is low and few rms would invest in standardization; for
high T; there are less innovations expired in the North and to be trickled
down to the South. In both cases, the labour in the North would be locked
up more in manufacturing sector. So for these extreme values of T , the





bS = 0:3  = 0:3 aS = 18 LS = 1:2  = 0:04
bN = 1 aN = 14 LN = 1 TN = 10 TS = 10
Parameters Growth (%) Std. rate (%) Ss Welfare Ns Welfare
Benchmark parameters results
3.997 0.908 34.289 41.308
Alternative parameters results
T = 1 3.832 0.104 -4.2768 38.234
T = 4 3.909 0.398 22.72 39.7
T = 7 3.962 0.665 30.994 40.572
T = 11 4.005 0.983 34.817 41.531
T = 14 4.022 1.196 35.373* 42.126
T = 17 4.029 1.390 34.928 42.607
T = 19 4.030* 1.509 34.285 42.863
T = 20 4.030 1.566 33.89 42.973
T = 24 4.023 1.779 31.964 43.296
T = 27 4.015 1.924 30.274 43.428
T = 30 4.004 2.057 28.455 43.48
T = 30:5 4.003 2.078 28.143 43.483*
T = 35 3.985 2.257 25.251 43.422
T = 39 3.969 2.399 22.596 43.273
T = 42 3.956 2.496 20.574 43.117
T = 46 3.941 2.615 17.853 42.863
T = 50 3.926 2.721 15.113 42.572
Table 2.3: Case i with e¤ects of di¤erent uniform patent lengths
though discounted value of rmsprot streams can be high. Likewise for
the South, if T goes to the extreme values - either too low or too high, less
standardization would be done in the South and so total amount of prots
and thus welfare of the South would be low. For example, if T = 0; the
South economy would not exist and thus welfare is zero.
As we can see from Table 2.3, the growth-maximizing T is around 19 and for
extreme values of T (T = 1 and T = 50) the growths are smaller. Mean-
while the welfare of the South is highest when T = 14 and that of the South
is when T is around 30:5. There is a disagreement on what T should be: the
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Figure 2.2: Welfare of the North in Case 1. Parameters: bS = 0:3; bN = 1;
 = 0:3; aS = 18; aN = 14; LS = 1:2; LN = 1
South wants to have a lower T then the North. The total-welfare-maximizing
value of T is 15.5, which is between the welfare-maximizing values of the
South and the North; and the corresponding total welfare (the sum of the
welfares of the two economies) is 77.624.
Result 3: If the patent length are forced to be uniform in both economies,
there is an optimal patent length for the total welfare of both economies
welfares. However, the patent length that maximizes the Norths welfare is
di¤erent from that of the South. This creates a conict of interests.
We have examined the rst case where KS = ne gTN   nS : Now, we would
do the same for the two other cases which are mentioned earlier.
2.5 Equilibrium results for the other two cases
Results of case 2 and case 3 are similar to those of case 1. We, rst, show the
proof of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium under monopoly pricing
for each case, followed by welfare function of the South in the respective
case. The welfare function of the North remains the same. The limit pricing
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Figure 2.3: Welfare of the South in Case 1. Parameters: bS = 0:3; bN = 1;
 = 0:3; aS = 18; aN = 14; LS = 1:2; LN = 1
conditions and welfare functions are recorded in the Appendix C.
2.5.1 Monopoly-pricing
We would now examine if we change the knowledge pool of the South, how
would the interaction of the two economies would change. Similar to the
rst case, we would analyze the equilibrium under the monopoly pricing.
For the limit-pricing case, we would report the two equations that dene
the equilibriums for both cases in the Appendix C.
Second case
Substitute KS = ne gTN into (2.24), we get:
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Proposition 9: If the following conditions:.
Condition 2:
lN (1  )   > Z























there exists a unique steady state equilibrium where  > 0 and g > 0. (See
Appendix A for proof)
Proposition 9 the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for case 2.
Here, again, the condition 2 is a su¢ cient condition, but not necessary. The
e¤ective labour in the North has to be big enough for equilibrium to exist
and be unique. Next, we would examine how the equilibrium would respond
to changes in e¤ective labours and to the changes of patent lengths.
Properties of the equilibrium under second case
Proposition 10 examines how e¤ective labour in each economy would a¤ect
g and :
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Proposition 10: (i) @@lS > 0 and
@g
@lS
> 0; (ii) @g@lN > 0 but the sign of
@
@lN
is unclear. (See Appendix A for proof)
The intuition for why the growth rate is higher if we increases lN is the same
with Proposition 8. However, it is unclear whether the standardization rate
is higher or lower. Mathematically, we can see that the standardization
rate can be higher or lower because of the shape of the graph that follows
equation (2.36). Intuitively, there are two opposite e¤ects that a¤ect the
standardization rate. First, higher growth rate implies higher n which would
help the standardization process easier. At the same time, higher n means
that the pool of innovations from which the South can target to standardize
is larger and thus would adversely a¤ect the standardization rate. Therefore
it depends on which e¤ect dominates.
Proposition 11 examines how patent length in each economy would a¤ect g
and :
Proposition 11: (i) @g@TN < 0 but the sign of
@
@TN
is unclear; (ii) @@TS > 0
and @g@TS > 0. (See Appendix A for proof)
The intuition for why the growth rate is lower if we increase TN is the same
with Proposition 8 part i. However, like Proposition 10 part ii, it is unclear
whether the standardization rate is higher or lower. The reasoning, both
mathematics and intuition, is the same with the reasoning of Proposition 10
part ii.
For the proposition 11 part ii, the intuition is similar to that of Proposition
8 part ii.
Now, let us analyse the welfares under the second case.
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Welfare e¤ects of patents under the second case
Here, we specify the welfare functions of the two economy under case 2.
Table 2.4 in Appendix C shows us how the welfare would respond to changes
in patent lengths. The welfare of the North is the same with (2.53) while
the welfare of the South is:









































(  1) 2 (2.37)
Next, we would study the last case where KS = n. First, we would show
the condition for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in this
case. Then, similar to the previous cases, we examine the properties of the
equilibrium under Proposition 13 and Proposition 14.
Third case under monopoly-pricing regime
Since the knowledge pool of the South is now di¤erent, we have to re-specify
the equilibrium condition of the South. After that, in Proposition 12, we
show the condition for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for case
3.
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(2.39)
Let the right-hand side of (2.39) be  (g)  we found that the equation
 (g) = 0 can have 0 or 1 or 2 or 3 roots depending on the parameter
values. However, due to the complexity of the graph we would restrict our
attention to the cases of 1 root and 0 root. The condition for these cases
are summarized in Proposition 11.
Proposition 12: If the following conditions:.
Condition 3:
lN (1  )   > Z^
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there exists a unique steady state equilibrium where  > 0 and g > 0. (See
Appendix B for proof)
Similar to the previous two cases, the condition for existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium under case 3 is su¢ cient but not necessary; also, here the
e¤ective labour has to big enough.
Properties of the equilibrium under the third case
Proposition 13 shows us how the equilibrium would respond to the e¤ective
labours, lS and lN ; and Proposition 14 examines how the equilibrium would
respond to changes in patent lengths.
Proposition 13: (i) @@lS > 0 and
@g
@lS
> 0; (ii) @g@lN > 0 and the sign of
@
@lN
is not very clear. (See Appendix B for proof)
The intuition for Proposition 13 is similar to Proposition 7.
Proposition 14: (i) @g@TN < 0 and
@
@TN
are not clear; (ii) @g@TS > 0 and
@
@TS
> 0. (See Appendix B for proof)
In fact, from table 2.5, when we increase TN from zero, we nd that the
growth rate increases and then decreases after some value of TN : This is
di¤erent from the rst and the second case where higher TN would lower
the growth rate. The answer to this observation lies in the nature of the
knowledge pool. In the rst and second cases, higher TN would cause three
e¤ects at the same time. First, less innovations are allowed to be standard-
ized because more innovations would be under patent protection. Second,
the knowledge pool is smaller for the South because the South can only
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learn of the knowledge of the products whose patents expire. Thus higher
TN means less innovations are standardized in the South. Hence, more in-
novations remains in the North which requires more labour to be employed
in manufacturing sector in the North, causing less labour employed in the
R&D sector. The third e¤ect is that when TN increases, the rms in the
North would enjoy longer monopolistic period so value of a Northern rm
would be higher. This creates higher incentive for rms to invest in R&D
by attracting the labour into R&D. This e¤ect would have positive inuence
on growth. The rst two e¤ects overwhelms the third e¤ect and the growth
rate is lowered as TN increases. However for the third case, the second e¤ect
is not a¤ected. In this case, the knowledge pool of the South is not a¤ected
by the Norths patent system and remains n: This means that whatever is
innovated in the North is immediately known by the South and becomes the
Souths knowledge. Only the rst e¤ect remains. For the low value of TN ;
a small increase of TN would cause growth rate to increase because the rst
e¤ect is not big enough to overwhelm the third e¤ect. But for higher value
of TN the rst e¤ect would dominate the third, causing lower growth rate.
The intuition for Proposition 14 part ii is similar to that of Proposition 8
part ii.
Next, we study the welfare under the third case.
Welfare e¤ects of patents under the third case
We now specify the welfare functions of the two economies under case 3. Ta-
ble 2.5 in Appendix C shows us how the welfare would respond to changes
in patent lengths. The welfare of the North is the same with (2.53); mean-
while the knowledge pool of the South under this case has changed, so the
specication of the welfare of the South also changes and is given as
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The results for welfares of both economies in cases 2 and 3 are similar
to that of case 1. We can see that there is an optimal TN for a given TS
at which the welfare of the North is optimal. When TS increases while TN
is xed at some value, the welfares of both economies would increase. The
intuition is similar to that of case 1.
2.6 Conclusion
Standardization in itself is a methodological innovation of how to produce
a product in a more e¢ cient way where the labour can be less skilled. Thus
it is natural to introduce standardization into open economies where one
economy (North) focuses on innovating while the other (South) on stan-
dardizing. The North labour are more skilled while the South labour are
less skilled; so it is natural for the North to just specialize on innovating and
not on standardizing because the South can learn how to standardize the
products also and undercut the North. Extending the model of Acemoglu
(2010) to the North-South open economy setting is one of our contribution
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in itself. In the open economy setting, we have to consider the trade across
the two economies and the price that the South rms have to set in order
to survive. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is proved with
some su¢ cient conditions in three di¤erent cases of knowledge pool that the
South can draw from. The three di¤erent cases are: (1) knowledge pool for
the South is those products of the North whose patents are expired but not
yet standardized; (2) all products that are expired in the North (including
those which are already expired); (3) all products innovated by the North
from the distant past.
In the monopoly pricing - that is, the monopolistic price in the South
is lower than the marginal cost of the North, we show that to have higher
growth rate, in all three cases the patent length in the South should be
innite. The reason is as follow. Less labour in the South would be spent
on manufacturing because the productsprices are kept high, keeping the
demand for them low, and more labour in the South would be spent on
learning how to standardize the Norths products. Once more products
are standardized, the respective rms in the North will lose its business
concerning respective products and are forced to innovate. Also, for the rst
two cases, (1) and (2), the longer the Norths patent length, the lower the
growth rate. The reason is that the longer the patent length, less products
are standardized and thus labour again is locked in manufacturing of goods,
not released to do R&D. However for the third case, it is not very clear from
mathematical point of view that the growth rate will increase if the patent
length is increased in the North.
In terms of welfare, it is always better for the South to keep the patent
length at innite. Meanwhile, for the all cases, there is an optimal patent
length for the North given the Souths patent length choice. The Nash
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equilibrium is when the South chooses the innite patent length and the
North would accordingly choose the optimal patent length that corresponds
to the choice of the South.
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2.7 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 9:
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Now if we let (g + )TS = x then,
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= 0; so if TS > T^S ; we have 0 (TS) > 0
So as long as we have   (TN ) > 0; where:
  (TN ) = 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We can have the following:
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So these are the following cases of ^ (g) : (1) increasing in g or (2) decreasing
in g or (3) has one minimum point or (4)one maximum point only for g > 0:
However, we have ^ (g ! 0+) =  1 (*  > 0) and ^ (g !1+)! 0: That
means only case 1 and case 4; are relevant, and for both cases, ^ (g) = 0
only has maximum one root. Let this root be ~g; we know that for g > ~g;




= 0 and ^ (g) > 0 for all
g > Z:We have the lowest possible value of g is lN (1  )   : As such,
the condition that we need so that Fg (g; ^ (g)) > 0 is:
Condition 2:
lN (1  )   > Z
























Now we need to show that F (g; ^ (g)) = 0 has only one root by showing the
conditions: F (lN (1  )  ; ^ (lN (1  )  )) < 0 and F (1; ^ (1))!
1 and Fg (g; ^ (g)) > 0:
At g = lN (1  )  , we have the solution for  to (2.36) is positive, call
this value , meanwhile (2.21) produces  = 0 or ^ (lN (1  )  ) = 0:
As such, if we substitute  into  of F (g; ) we would have a negative value
for F (g; ) ; this is because F2 (g; ) < 0: So F (lN (1  )  ; ) < 0:
Also F (1; ^ (1))!1:
Thus, if the conditions 2 is satised, the equation F (g; ^ (g)) = 0 has only
one root. The equilibrium is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 10 (part i): Let the graph that follows equation
(2.36) be  = ^ (g) ; we also have the graph that follows equation (2.21) as
 =  (g) :
If we have lS to increase, then for a given . This would mean that ^ (g) would
shifts upwards, cutting  (g) at higher g and higher : This is because  (g)
is also increasing in g: 
Proof of Proposition 10 (part) ii:
If lN increases, the graph  (g) will shift to the right, it will cut ^ (g) at















So it depends on which e¤ect dominates, if E¤ect 1 dominates at the point
of intersection then ^ (g) is upward-sloping at this point; and thus the equi-
librium standardization rate would be higher. If E¤ect 2 dominates, the
reverse is true and the equilibrium standardization rate would be lower.
Proof of Proposition 11 (part i):
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Figure 2.4: Labour-clearing condition graphs of Case 2
If TN increases, the graph  (g) would pivots inwards around the point
(lN (1  )  ; 0) ;cut ^ (g) at lower g. Opposite of the Proof of Proposi-
tion 10 part ii, we have when if E¤ect 1 dominates at the point of intersection
then ^ (g) is upward-sloping at this point; and thus the equilibrium stan-
dardization rate would be lower. If E¤ect 2 dominates, the reverse is true
and the equilibrium standardization rate would be higher.
Proof of Proposition 11 (part ii): Similar to proof of Proposition 8
part ii.
2.8 Appendix B
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Now if we let (g + )TS = x then,

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> 0; so if TS > T^S ; we have 0 (TS) > 0
So as long as we have   (TN ) > 0; where:










































We can have the following:
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So these are the following cases of ^ (g) : (1) increasing in g or (2) decreasing
in g or (3) has one minimum point or (4)one maximum point only for g > 0:
However, we have ^ (g ! 0+) =  1 ( because  > 0) and ^ (g !1+)!
0: That means only case 1 and case 4; are relevant, and for both cases,
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^ (g) = 0 only has maximum one root. Let this root be ~g; we know that for




= 0 and ^ (g) > 0 for
all g > Z^:We have the lowest possible value of g is lN (1  ) : As such,
the condition that we need so that Fg (g; ^ (g)) > 0 is:
Condition 3:
lN (1  )   > Z^























Now we need to show that F (g; ^ (g)) = 0 has only one root by showing the
conditions: F (lN (1  )  ; ^ (lN (1  )  )) < 0 and F (1; ^ (1))!
1 and Fg (g; ^ (g)) > 0:
At g = lN (1  )   , we have the solution for  to the equation (2.38)
is positive since ^ (Z) = 0 and lN (1  )    > Z; call this value ,
meanwhile if g = lN (1  )   ; the equation (2.21) produces  = 0 or
^ (lN (1  )  ) = 0: As such, if we substitute  into  of F (g; ) we
would have a negative value for F (g; ) ; this is because F2 (g; ) < 0: So
F (lN (1  )  ; ) < 0:
Also F (1; ^ (1))!1:
Thus, if the conditions 3 is satised, the equation F (g; ^ (g)) = 0 has only
one root. The equilibrium is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 13 (part i):
Let the graph that follows equation (2.39) be  = ^ (g) ; we also have the
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Figure 2.5: Labour-clearing condition graphs of Case 3
graph that follows equation (2.21) as  =  (g) :
If we have lS to increase, then for a given . This would mean that ^ (g)
would pivot upwards around the origin, cutting  (g) at higher g and higher
: This is because  (g) is also increasing in g:
Proof of Proposition 13 (part ii):
If lN increases, the graph  (g) will shift to the right, it will cut ^ (g) at
















So it depends on which e¤ect dominates, if E¤ect 3 dominates at the point
of intersection then ^ (g) is upward-sloping at this point; and thus the equi-
librium standardization rate would be higher. If E¤ect 4 dominates, the
reverse is true and the equilibrium standardization rate would be lower.
Proof of Proposition 14 (part i):
If TN increases, the graph  (g) would pivots inwards around the point
(lN (1  )  ; 0) ;cut ^ (g) at lower g. Opposite of the Proof of Proposi-
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tion 13 part ii, we have when if E¤ect 3 dominates at the point of intersection
then ^ (g) is upward-sloping at this point; and thus the equilibrium stan-
dardization rate would be lower. If E¤ect 4 dominates, the reverse is true
and the equilibrium standardization rate would be higher.
Proof of Proposition 14 (part ii): Similar to proof of Proposition 8 part
ii
2.9 Appendix C
2.9.1 Limit pricing under rst case
Now we examine the case where the price in the South is higher than the
marginal cost of the North. Under this regime, the North can declare a price
war and cut down its price below that of the South if the price in the South
is set higher than wN . Thus, the South would have to apply limit pricing
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erTN (1  e rTS ) = A (2.47)
So for given set of parameters and a TN su¢ ciently large, we can see that if
TS increases, there would be a TS such that A < 1:
If A < 1, the price of rms in the South is larger than that of the mar-
ginal cost of the North. Thus, rms in the North can still ght against the
standardization process by undercut the price of economy S. The Bertrand
equilibrium is that the South would limit the price to PN or wNbN as long
as the marginal cost of producing 1 unit of nal goods in the South does
not exceed that of the North.
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The labour equilibrium of the South would be:
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(2.52)
The relationship of g and  under the limit-pricing regime is highly non-
linear; therefore, we resort to the numerical method to analyse the e¤ects
TNand TS on the growth rates and welfare of the two economies.
Welfare under limit-pricing regime of rst case The di¤erence be-
tween the welfares under monopoly-pricing regime and limit-pricing regime
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Where the ratio wSwN is given in (2.49).
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2.9.2 Second case under limit pricing regime
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2.9.3 Welfares of second case under limit-pricing regime
The welfare of the North is the same with the rst case in monopoly-pricing
regime.

































1  e gTS+ e gTS  (wS=wN )























(  1) 2 (2.56)
2.9.4 Third case under limit-pricing regime
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2.9.5 Welfares of third case under limit-pricing regime
The welfare of the North is the same with the rst case in monopoly-pricing
regime.
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bS = 0:3  = 0:3 aS = 18 LS = 1:2  = 0:04
bN = 1 aN = 14 LN = 1 TN = 5 TS = 10
Parameters Growth (%) Std. rate (%) Ss Welfare Ns Welfare
Benchmark parameters results
4.161 1.898 51.444 44.186
Alternative parameters results
TN = 1 4.175 1.904 56.302 43.772
TN = 3 4.173 1.902 53.878 44.035
TN = 5 4.161 1.898 51.444 44.186
TN = 7 4.15 1.893 49.012 44.25
TN = 10 4.13 1.885 45.422 44.225
TN = 12 4.115 1.878 43.063 44.149
TN = 15 4.093 1.869 39.588 43.97
TN = 17 4.078 1.862 37.319 43.82
TN = 20 4.056 1.852 33.988 43.563
TS = 5 3.945 0.562 28.014 40.433
TS = 9 4.041 1.061 40.994 41.999
TS = 13 4.012 1.606 48.626 43.468
TS = 19 4.229 2.522 55.887 45.576
TS = 25 4.318 3.567 60.704 47.498
TS = 29 4.369 4.337 63.154 48.637
TS = 35 4.435 5.594 66.079 50.1
TS = 39 4.472 6.488 67.654 50.909
TS = 43 4.505 7.412 68.993 51.592




bS = 0:3  = 0:3 aS = 18 LS = 1:2  = 0:04
bN = 1 aN = 14 LN = 1 TN = 5 TS = 15
Parameters Growth (%) Std. rate (%) Ss Welfare Ns Welfare
Benchmark parameters results
4.2446 2.6798 56.368 45.638
Alternative parameters results
TN = 1 4.1911 2.0324 57.29 44.005
TN = 5 4.2446 2.6798 56.368 45.638
TN = 10 4.2971 3.9788 55.09 47.631
TN = 15 4.3358 6.4831 53.715 49.584
TN = 20 4.4109 12.95 52.272 51.497
TN = 23 4.3719 25.663 51.377 52.617
TN = 26 4.3762 172.44 50.456 53.703*
TN = 30 4.0533 4376.8 44.287 51.689
TN = 35 3.6493 12012 36.851 48.535
TS = 5 3.9764 0.71398 31.167 41.247
TS = 9 4.0947 1.4027 45.065 43.104
TS = 13 4.1978 2.2171 53.31 44.817
TS = 19 4.3303 3.7373 61.206 47.192
TS = 25 4.4412 5.7308 66.461 49.228
TS = 29 4.5045 7.4024 69.125 50.344
TS = 35 4.5851 10.568 72.283 51.631
TS = 39 4.6298 13.215 73.96 52.241
TS = 43 4.6679 16.377 75.363 52.676
Table 2.5: Case iii with e¤ects of di¤erent patent lengths
Chapter 3
Branch innovations and
reverse spill-over with R&D
subsidies
3.1 Introduction
In the literature of North-South open economy setting, the South is con-
sidered as solely imitator that learns to copy the products innovated in the
North.1 However, it is quite clear nowadays that the developing economies
are also innovating in some sense. A product that is innovated in the North
has a very original or "disruptive" concept which no one ever has thought
of before can be learnt by the South. After that, the South can come out
with a way to apply the concept of the product innovated in the North to
come out with variety of products that can add new features to the products
from the North then gradually creating a new product of the same concept.
1Examples of studies that make use of North-South open economy setting are Liao
and Wong (2009), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) and
Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011)
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For example, the concept of a car originated from US but car makers in
Japan, like Toyota, have made thousands of adjustments to produce hybrid
cars. So in fact, incremental innovation does produce in the end a seemingly
original innovation, but bare in mind that the original concept of a car is
still developed in the North. Japan has managed to produce massively inex-
pensive and fuel-e¢ cient cars which really help to compete with the United
States and German cars. This is what we call "branch innovation" - that is
innovation that arises out of the concept of the other innovations. Another
example to show how the South can produce innovations that are based on
the concept of the North is mentioned in Yin and Keith (2010). Optical
storage media began with the innovation of compact disc in the early 1980s.
Learning the technology, a Chinese rm, Wanyan Electronics, invented video
compact disc (VCD) and the corresponding players by combining CD and
MPEG-1 standard. However, the products are famous in China but not
patented and not well known in the developed economies (Xu (2006)). The
technology of VCD was copied by other rms, some of whom came out with
di¤erent standards for VCD and claimed patents for these. Here clearly, the
developing economy does have some capacity to invent new products from
a product concept.
Kapur (2010) well illustrates how the developing economies do have capac-
ity to innovate on their own. He explains how Taiwan, Korea and China
are successful in their R&D activities themselves; many products are com-
petitive in the global markets and a large number of patents are registered:
"Samsung Electronics alone has 42 R&D Centres with around 26,000 em-
ployees (UK in Korea (2009)), and each year it invests at least 9% of its
sales revenues in R&D. According to a company web site, it registered over
17,000 patents in 2006, and its over-2400 patents in the US were the second-
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most of any company." However, one can take note of the innovations from
the developing economies are largely built on the concepts developed in the
developed economies. Yin and Keith (2010) list a number of stylized facts
to support the evidence of the developing economies learning to imitate and
produce innovations themselves by looking at countries as Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, China, India, and the Republic of Korea.
The fact that the South also innovates is only recently paid attention to.
Glass (1999) introduces imitation as a stepping stone to innovation. Kapur
(2010) recognizes that the South is becoming more innovative and added
this feature in his study. Together with the trade theory2 - mainly focusing
on factor endowments and intensities and the endowment of skilled labour
- he argues that in equilibrium the South would focus on less skill-intensive
products. Our idea is also in alignment with this in the sense that producing
innovations from available concepts can be reasonably assumed to require
less skills and therefore the less developed economy can do it. Yin and Keith
(2010) study how introducing the innovation in the South can a¤ect the
growth rate. They look into two scenarios: (1) the innovation in the South
does not have any reverse spill-over e¤ect, (2) there is reverse spill-over e¤ect.
They nd that in the rst scenario, the growth rate is lower than that if the
South only focuses on imitation. In the second scenario, if the reverse spill-
over e¤ect is strong enough, the growth rate can be higher than if the South
only imitates. In this study, we also examine the e¤ect of the reverse spill-
over e¤ect of economy Js innovations on economy U and the global economy
as a whole. Branstetter (2006) studies Japanese FDI in US and nds that
FDI boosts the knowledge spill-overs "both from and to the investing rms.
2See Feenstra (1990), Romer (1990), Segerstrom, Anat, and Dinopoulos (1990), Young
(1991), Rivera-Batiz and Romer(1991a) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer(1991b) for how trade
policies and intergration a¤ect the growth rate.
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Japan, in much sense, is like economy J while the United States is like
economy U. Here, Branstetter (2006) shows that there is a spill-overs from
Japanese rms to the US economy. Even though the channel of knowledge
spill-overs from Japan to the US is through Japanese FDI in the US in his
study, it lends us a strong support to our argument that there are reverse
spill-overs from economy J to economy U3. Ertur and Koch (2011) make
use spatial econometrics to study the global interdependence by looking at
international R&D spillovers. They nd that increasing R&D expenditures
by 1% in USA would cause 0.0152% increase TFP of Japan, while Japans
1 % increase in R&D expenditure causes 0.0034% increase in TFP of USA.
(Koreas 1% increase in R&D expenditure causes 0.004% increase in USAs
TFP while USs 1% increase in R&D expenditure causes 0.0112% in Koreas
TFP). This provides evidence that the emerging economies do have spill-over
e¤ect on the leading economies like the US4. Chui et. al. (2001) build a
model where the North innovates and the South has four di¤erent stages
of development: (1) only producing traditional goods, (2) copying high-
technology goods, (3) both copying and innovating, and (4) specializing
in innovation. Another phenomena that helps the emerging economies to
innovate is the returns of entrepreneurs from overseas (Liu et. al. (2010))
name this group as returnee entrepreneurs). Our research also look at the
aspect of the less developed economy (we call "economy J") also innovating
but we di¤er by modeling these innovations to be based on the original
concepts of innovations in the more developed economy (we call "economy
U"). Also, in most of the studies that we survey, the learning channel is FDI,
3 If Japans FDI can generate spill-overs to the US economy, we assume that innovations
produce in Japan itself should produce spill-overs to the US economy. It can happen
through trade ows or knowledge ows.
4The aspects of technological spill-overs - channels, e¤ects and distance - are discussed
in chapter 1 with reference to Coe and Helpman (1995), Keller (2001), Keller (2004),
Acharya and Keller (203;) and others.
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through which the developing economies learn to imitate and accumulate
enough knowledge to innovate themselves: for example, Yin and Keith (2010)
and Kapur (2010). Liu et. al. (2010) discuss this e¤ect in China and
points out that intensity of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in an industry
does not help local innovation. Our paper does not include FDI. The less
developed economy in our paper can be understood as having already passed
the state of needing FDI to be able to learn and innovate; an example is
Japan. In our rst part of the chapter, we assume labour to be homogenous
and can be used in both R&D and manufacturing. In the second part, we
introduce skilled and unskilled labour. Only skilled labour can work in the
R&D sector and both skilled and unskilled labour are required to produce
manufactured goods. The production function is Cobb-Douglas with only
two inputs - skilled and unskilled labour. We also introduce the public policy
- R&D subsidies in both economies - to see how the subsidy policy would
a¤ect the growth rate and welfares. The reason for introducing subsidies
is the same with that in chapter one where economies can promote R&D
activities to capture the knowledge spill-over e¤ect (see Minniti Antonio
et. al. (2013), Jones and Williams (1998)). Without incentives, rms, in
the process of maximizing their own benets, do not take consideration of
the externality of their R&D activities to the society (see Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Jones and
William (2000)). So governments intervention to promote R&D activities
can be welfare improving.5
What we nd in this study is that more subsidies from either economy will
produce higher growth but not necessarily higher welfare. There are two
5Few studies look at the e¤ect of R&D subsidies in a closed economy (eg. Zeng and
Zhang (2007), Segestrom (2000), and Gomez and Sequeria (2012)). Grossman and Help-
man (1990) did examine how R&D subsidies a¤ect the economy with two economies with
similar characteristics.
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opposite e¤ects that a¤ect the welfare as the subsidy rates increases. More
subsidy will lead to higher welfare through growth e¤ect, however, more
subsidy on the other hand leads to lower static consumption level. As such,
in economy U, we nd that there is an optimal subsidy rate which gives the
highest welfare for that economy given economy Js choice of subsidy rate.
For economy J, if its innovations contribute little to the worlds knowledge
pool, the optimal subsidy rate for economy J is zero. If this contribution is
large enough, the optimal subsidy rate is positive and nite. This interaction
between the two economies - one responds to the choice of subsidy rate of the
other - leads to Nash equilibrium. Yin and Keith (2010) did not analyse these
welfare e¤ects between the two economies. Also, in the second part of the
chapter, we are able to see the wage ratio between the skilled and unskilled
workers within an economy, as well as comparing this ratio with the other
economy. Berman et. al. (1998) claim that the skill-biased technological
change is the cause of the fall in demand for less skilled workers in developed
economies. However, they nd that across the OECD economies, "most
industries have increased the proportion of skilled workers employed despite
rising or stable relative wages". Bernard and Jensen (1997) nd that an
increase in employment in the export plants increases the relative demand
for skilled labour, which leads to a larger wage gap between the skilled and
unskilled labour. Autor et. al. (1998) show that "the spread of computer
technology may explain as much as 30 to 50 percent of the increase in the rate
of growth of the wage-bill share of more-skilled workers since 1970". Here,
our results show that the higher the reverse spill-over e¤ect, the higher the
wage ratios (or wage gap) in both economies. Also, the wage ratios between
wage rates of skilled workers and between wage rates of unskilled workers
also increase. The detailed discussion on the wage ratio is in propositions 6,
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7 and 8.
The arrangement of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 species the model
with homogenous labour, Section 3.3 solves this model, presents the numeri-
cal results and analyzes the results. Section 3.4 extends the model to include
skilled and unskilled labour and solves this model. Finally, Section 3.5 re-
ports the numerical results and analysis of the results.
3.2 Model
The model is a simple one where we employ the similar setting of North-
South economy of Segerstrom and Gusta¤son (2011) . There would be still
a leader in innovations, however there is a di¤erence: the follower is not
the type that copies the innovations through imitation or standardization.
Rather, the follower also innovates but their innovations are built from the
leaders innovation concepts. We call the leaders innovations as base in-
novations and the followers as branch innovations. The base innovations
are those ideas that are original and never exist before that. Meanwhile,
the branch innovations adapt the ideas of base innovations to appropriate
applications. However, the two kind of innovations are symmetric in term of
utility even though the base innovations are original. This is understandable
because the users would rather look at the usage of the products regardless
of whether it is original or adapted one. For example, Iphone is the original
idea of touchable phone, but to the users, smart phones that come from
Samsung, HTC or Apple would make no di¤erence in value to them. In
the case of the imitation or standardization, when the South manage to
copy the products from the North, the North would lose its products for-
ever. However in this paper, even when an innovations idea is adapted
by the follower to produce the corresponding branch innovation, the rm
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that produce that particular base innovation would still enjoy monopolistic
prot from its products. The reason is that the branch innovation would
have di¤erent creative functions of its own, thus has no value conict with
the base innovation. In this model, all products would enjoy monopolistic
prots forever.
This model has two economies with initials U and J; and the only input factor
is labour which are spent in two activities or two sectors: manufacturing
product varieties and producing R&D. The rest of labour would be spent in
leisure. Labour cannot move from one economy to the other but are allowed
to move across the sectors. Within an economy, there is not di¤erence in
wage for all workers as the labour market is competitive. The R&D labour in
U produces original or base innovations while the R&D labour in J produces
adapted or branch innovations.
3.2.1 Households
Both economies have a xed number of households, Li where i = J; U . Each
household would have a xed one unit of time devoted to work and leisure.
Wage and assets from shares in rms are the only sources of the income of
each household. However, there is a tax, of rate ti (where i = U; J) levied
on wage of the labour. This tax revenue would be used by the government
to subsidize the cost of R&D activities in respective economies. Since we
have leisure in our model, the tax would not be equivalent to a lump sum
tax. Let the Eit denote the representative consumers expenditure, %it be
the leisure spent by that consumer in economy i at time t:
Households in both economies have identical preferences over both consump-













where  is the weight of how leisure contributes to the utility,  is the
discount rate and uit is the static utility of the representative household in








0 <  < 1 (3.2)
where xit (!) denotes the product (or nal goods) variety ! consumed by
the representative household in economy i at time t; nt is the number of
product varieties in the world market. From now on, we would omit the
time subscript unless confusion arises. Here,  denotes the degree of product
di¤erentiation, the elasticity of substitution between the product varieties
is 11  = :
Each person in economy i will maximise static utility subjected to the chosen
expenditure at time  .

























The constraint functions (3.3) tells us that the ow of assets that a house-
hold has at any point in time would be equal to the di¤erence between the
income - from interest earning of savings (or assets) and after-tax wage, and
the expenditure spent on goods produced locally and goods imported from
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the foreign economy. We denote the superscript of xji which is j (where
j = U; J and i = U; J), to be the economy that buys the product and the
subscript, which is i to be the economy that produce the product. When
only the subscript is present, it means the overall production of that partic-
ular economy. And xji represents the demand of a product from economy i





Setting up the Hamiltonian function for the utility maximization in economy
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The rst order conditions of (3.4) that characterize the utility maximization











































We can work out leisure to be:

%U
= UwU (1  tU ) =
wU (1  tU )












wU (1  tU ) =
EU
LUwU (1  tU ) (3.7)

















EU because whatever the revenue that one economy get from selling its
products would be spent in buying foreign products and the local products.












 = JPxJ (3.9)

%J
= JwJ(1  tJ) =
wJ(1  tJ)
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= r    (3.11)
where E =
P
i=U;J Ei, that is the total expenditure of the world economy.


















The rms would maximize prots through price setting. To produce each
unit of nal goods, economy i would need bi units of labour. The prot
functions of each rm can be written as follows:















where pJ is the monopoly price set by economy J, pUt; is the price set by
economy U, wJ is the wage in economy J and wU economy U.
The price of the products in each economy is marked up by the factor of
1

and subject to the production productivity of each economy and the wage.
3.2.3 Innovations: Base and branch
In order to innovate and develop a new product variety, a particular rm
in economy i needs to use aiKit units of labour, where ai is economy is
innovative R&D productivity parameter, Kit is the knowledge pool that is
useful for economy i in the process of innovation. The knowledge pool of
the U economy is made up of all innovations born in this economy and spill-
over from economy J . We allows some weight to measure how the spill-over
from economy J may contribute to the knowledge pool of economy U . Let
this weight be : Thus, we have KU = nU + nJ . Denote the amount of
labour employed in the R&D sector of economy U to be LRU , the number of





(nU + nJ) (3.16)
Similarly, a rm in economy J would have to use aJKJt units of labour produce
"branch innovations" based on the innovations from economy U , where aJ
is economy Js innovative R&D productivity parameter, KJt is the knowl-
edge pool that is useful for economy J in the process of innovation. We
would consider the case of KJ = nU   nJ : This means that whatever that
is not "adapted" by economy J would be useful in the process of branch
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innovating. This assumption is reasonable because economy J would only
target economy U 0s innovations that have not yet been adapted. The larger
the target pool, the higher number of successful branch innovations there
would be ( _nJ is higher). This setting of knowledge pool of economy J also
renders a convenience in modelling because the rate of "branch" innovations
(similar with the rate of imitation in Segerstrom and Gusta¤son (2011)) is
only inuenced by LRJ ; the amount of labour employed in economy J; and
aJ ; the R&D productivity parameter in economy J:










A rm in both economies enjoy the monopolistic prots forever. There is no
threat from business stealing in this model. However, by having the presence
of economy J , economy U would have to spend to import from economy J
but they have economy J as a market to sell their products to. Similar
analysis can be applied for economy J: The branch innovation of economy J
does in fact generate wealth for the world which benets economy U because
of economy Js role as market and the reverse spill-over e¤ect from economy
J:
The value of a rm in economy i at time of being innovated is sum of






t risdsi (!) d = Vit (!) (3.18)




Let Ci be the R&D cost of innovating and developing a product variety,








The cost of R&D for one innovation is the wage paid to the amount of
labour needed to produce that innovation in economy i. However, since
the government subsidizes this cost at the rate of zi, we needs to multiply
the raw cost with the factor of 1  zi. Note that knowledge Ki is inversely
proportional to the cost of R&D. This is because for economy U; the larger
the knowledge pool the easier it is to innovate and for economy J; larger
KJ means more innovations in economy U are not yet adapted; so the pool
of innovations for targeting is larger, thus easier to produce one branch
innovation from this pool, KJ .
Also, we notice that PiKi in the steady state would be constant. This is
because both Pi and Ki grow at the same rate in steady state. As such, Ci,
in steady state would be a constant.







= 0 (Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1990)). Here the
price would grow at the same rate with the number of varieties produced
in either economy (in steady state, number of varieties produced by each
economy would grow at the same rate). This assumption is in accordance
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with the normalization proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1990) where
the price is a product of total number of varieties and a constant - thus, price
grows at the same rate with number of varieties. This normalization, they
claim, is a necessary condition for convergence to a steady state equilibrium
with positive R&D in both economies.
In equilibrium, the number of rms that enter the market would be such
that there is no prot for each rm. Whatever the discounted ow of prots
into the rm would be just enough to cover the cost of the innovations. This
is because if there is any prot left over, other rms would enter to gain from








Also, the rate of returns, ri would have to be the same across the economies,
that is rU = rJ = r:
Labour market
Labour market in both economies are assumed to be perfectly competitive
and the labour in each economy is allowed to move from one sector to the
other. Therefore within an economy, there is only one wage which would
adjust instantaneously so that the labour market always clears. The labour-
market clearing condition in economy i would be:
Li = nibixi +
ai
Ki
_nit + Li%it (3.22)
Government budget balance As we mentioned earlier that the subsidies
would be funded by the taxes on labour income. Total income of labour
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would be the product of wage times the labour provided Liwi f1  %ig in
economy i; so the total tax revenue is Liwi f1  %ig ti. At any point in
time, the ow of innovations generated is also the number of rms that
come to birth. The total amount of labour employed in R&D sector in
economy i at any particular time is
ai
Ki
_ni and total cost amounts up to
wiai
Ki




_nizi. Combining with the government budget balance, in the
sense that the amount of subsidy is equal to amount of tax revenue collected,
we have the following:






LU f1  %Ug [nU + nJ ]
(3.23)
wJLJ f1  %Jg tJ =
wJaJ
nU   nJ zJ _nJ
tJ =
zJaJ _nJ
LJ f1  %Jg [nU   nJ ]
(3.24)
Combining (3.23) and (3.24) with (3.7) and (3.10), we can solve for respective
tax in terms of the parameters and g and :
3.3 Steady-state equilibrium
We solve the model for steady-state equilibrium by imposing the no-arbitrage
condition across the economies, no incentives for capital ight from one econ-
omy to another. Also, all the endogenous variables grow over time at corre-
sponding constant rates. In the end, we will reduce the number of equations
to two with two unknown -  and g (the growth rate of number of product
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varieties); which characterize the equilibrium.
At the steady state equilibrium, we have nJ ; nU and n to grow at the same









= g: Our model is similar to Grossman and
Helpman (1989) in the sense that we have both economies to innovate but
the di¤erence is that economy J follows economy U . So g is determined by























Now let us look at the equilibrium condition in the North. At steady state
equilibrium, rU = rJ = r:
From (3.21) and (3.13), we have:
xU =
r (1  zU )










Substituting (3.25) into (3.22), we have the labour market clearing condition
for economy J:
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LJ = bJnJxJ + aJ
_nJ
nU   nJ + LJ%J
= bJnJxJ + aJ
_nJ
nU   nJ +
EJ
wJ (1  tJ)
= bJnJxJ + aJ
_nJ























 (g + ) (1  zJ)
1   + g

Subtituting (3.26) into (3.22), we have the labour market clearing condition
for economy U:
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 (g + ) (1  zJ)
1   + g

(3.28)
where tU , tJ ; zU and zJ would have to follow (3.23) and (3.24).
For the ease of mathematical analysis, we would now consider the case of no
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(3.30)
















Proposition 1: There exists unique positive g and  in steady state equi-
librium, given the following condition:
	 (lU ; lJ) > (+ ) 
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Proof:





where h (g) =
(+ ) (g + )
1   + g
Substituting (3.31) into (3.29), we have:
lU =
g + glJh(g)
g + (1 + ) glJh(g)

(+ ) (g + )
1   + g

=
fh (g) + lJgh (g)
h (g) + (1 + ) lJ
) lU [h (g) + (1 + ) lJ ] = h (g)2 + lJh (g)
) h (g)2 + flJ   lUgh (g)  (1 + ) lJ lU = 0
So
h (g) =
 flJ   lUg 
h




We know that h0 (g) > 0 so h (g) cannot take negative root if g > 0: So we




(lJ   lU )2 + 4 (1 + ) lJ lU
i1=2
2
However, in order to make sure that g > 0, we should have h (g) > h (0)
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) lJ lU
i1=2   lJ + lU
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(lJ   lU )2 + 4 (1 + ) lJ lU






(lJ + lU )
2 + 4lJ lU
i1=2   lJ + lU
2
1CA
which is unique and positive. And from (3.31), for a unique and positive
value of g, we also have a corresponding unique and positive value of .
Proposition 1 tells us that there is only one possible equilibrium where the
economy will converge to in the long run. Meanwhile the condition stated
is to make sure that the size of the e¤ective labour has to be big enough
so that there is enough incentive for investing in R&D. If  is too large,
people would like to have more leisure and would not want to work. If  is
too big, the people are too impatient and just want to consume and thus
would not invest. Therefore Proposition 1 also tells us that  and  must
be su¢ ciently small.
3.3.1 Welfare
Once we solve for g and , we can substitute into the expressions for re-
spective leisures, demands for nal goods which determine the welfare of a
representative household in each economy. Before doing this, we need to
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Now we can proceed to formulate the welfare functions of both economies.
The welfare is made of two parts - consumption of goods and consumption
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(  1) 2 (3.35)
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Here the welfare is the sum of all discounted static utilities, consisting of
two components: consumptions and leisure. As we can see from the above
expression, there are three terms in all. The rst two make up the utility
from consuming. The consumption of any economy is derived by taking the
national income divided by the consumer price index (pixini is the total in-






is the consumer price index.
In the nal expression, we rearrange the terms and separate the two e¤ects
- consumption e¤ect and growth e¤ect. The growth e¤ect is captured by
g
( 1)2 while the consumption e¤ect by the rest.
3.3.2 Analysis
In this section we would analyse how R&D subsidies would a¤ect the two
economies in terms of growth and welfares. The bench-mark parameters
that we are using are: LU = 1, LJ = 1:2; aU = 5; aJ = 2; bU = 1; bJ = 0:3;
 = 0:035;  = 1,  = 0:3:We would also examine the case where  = 0:7 to
illustrate how any change of reverse spill-over e¤ect would a¤ect the growth
e¤ect and the consumption e¤ect in each economy. In particular, when 
is small, the Nash equilibrium, where each economy would choose a subsidy
rate that maximize its welfare given the other economys choice of subsidy
rate, is a "corner point" (zJ = 0 and zU > 0). However, when  is big
enough, the Nash equilibrium is an "interior point" where zU and zJ are
positive values.
Table 3.1 reports how the growth rate, branch innovation rate and welfares
of the two economies would respond to the change in each parameters with
other parameters being constant. We have a benchmark set of variables and
from there we change parameters one by one. The benchmark parameters
would give a result that the per person welfare of economy J is lower than
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that of economy U: In bench-mark case, we allow the productivities of R&D
and of nal goods production to be higher in economy J . It is understand-
able for economy Js R&D productivity to be greater than that of economy
U - that is, aJ to be bigger than aU , because the R&D activities in the
two economy are di¤erent in nature. Usually, it is harder to produce a base
innovation because the idea being created has never been thought of before
- in another word, original. In contrast, the branch innovation can be easier
because it involves coming innovative ideas of using the base innovation to
solve certain problems or to adopt it to di¤erent areas.
In Table 3.1, we increase , the welfare of both economies would drop.
This is because 1 is the markup of the price from the marginal cost so an
increase of  would mean lower monopolistic power of the rms in both
economies. As such, the rms would invest less in R&D activities and both
the growth rate and the branch innovation rate are lower (see Table 3.1).
We cannot see clearly how the consumption e¤ect and leisure e¤ect are like
in the case of increase in : However, less labour employed in R&D means
more labour for manufacturing and leisure. Nevertheless, the growth e¤ect,
through numerical evidence, dominates both consumption and leisure e¤ects
combined.
As expected, improvement in R&D productivity in either economy would
raise the growth (see Table 3.1). If aU decreases, one unit of labour can
produce more innovations in economy U ; this means we would have higher
growth. Meanwhile, in order to keep up with the high growth of base inno-
vations generated in economy U , economy J needs to allocate more workers











 (g + )
1   + g
(3.36)
We can see that
@
@g
> 0. Therefore, if g increases, we should have  to
increase:
If aJ decreases, the R&D productivity of economy J is higher and so the
branch innovation rate,  would increase. From (3.36), we knows that g
would also increase. Intuitively, as more branch innovations are successful
in economy J , this reverse spill-over knowledge from economy J to economy
U would increase. This helps the creation of base innovations to be easier,
thus higher is g:
The productivities in nal goods production, bU and bJ , does not appear in
the two equilibrium equations (3.29) and (3.30). As we can see from Table
3.1, changing these parameters would not change the growth rate and the
branch innovation rate. However, bU and bJ would change the welfare of the
two economies through the price. The amount of quantity demanded for
one variety in respective economy is proportionally smaller as bU or bJ gets
bigger. Meanwhile the price of goods of the corresponding economy would
be higher; but this positive income e¤ect from price is still lower than the
negative e¤ect that comes from the drop in demand for that economys nal
goods. Therefore the consumers in both economies U and J , as reected in
the drop of welfares of both economies in Table 3.1. From the results that
we compiled, we nd that an increase in bi would lead to lower welfare in
both economies but the home economy, or economy i, su¤ers a bigger drop
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in welfare. For example, as bJ goes up from 0.2 to 0.5, welfare in economy
J drops from 112.471 to 94.713 while that of economy U from 109.116 to
99.212; the drop of welfare in economy J is higher. When bU increases from
0.7 to 1.2, welfare in economy J drops from 107.804 to 101.380 while that
of economy U from 109.116 to 102.822; the drop of welfare in economy U is
larger.
If LU increases, more labour can be spent in R&D activities in the North
and thus we have higher growth. We also know that g is positively related to
 (from (3.36)). However, we can see that as LU rises, both economies would
benet in term of welfare per household but the gain in welfare in economy
J is larger than that of economy U: Observe that when LU increases from
1 to 1.4, the welfare of economy U increases from 104.579 to 157.38 while
that of economy J from 104.459 to 161.932. If LJ increases, we should have
the rate of branch innovation,  to increase and thus nJ would increase,
enlarging the knowledge pool for economy U: However, the gain in welfare
from economy J as LJ increases is smaller than that of economy U: We can
see that the spill-over e¤ect from increase in labour in one economy is larger
for the "other" economy.
Expectedly, a rise in discount factor  would lead to lower growth and rate
of branch innovation and welfares as the whole. If the patience of the people
is lower, that is  is higher, the people care more about consuming rather
than investing in the future. Therefore, less investment or labour would be
spent on R&D activities, causing lower growth and welfare. Meanwhile, rise
of the importance of leisure as measured by  would depress growth and
rate of branch innovation because more time spent on leisure, less on work.
Welfares are thus lower as well.
The spill-over e¤ect  is good for the world economy - the higher it is,
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Benchmark
bJ = 0:3  = 0:3 aJ = 2 LJ = 1:2  = 0:035
bU = 1 aU = 5 LU = 1  = 1  = 0:3
Parameters g (%)  (%) Js Welfare Us Welfare
Benchmark parameters results
6.22 15.38 104.459 104.579
Alternative parameters results
 = 0:35 5.526 13.660 68.469 66.124
 = 0:4 4.832 11.944 43.759 38.948
aU = 4 8.225 16.450 138.286 139.722
aU = 6 4.864 14.308 82.131 81.310
aJ = 1 6.463 31.065 115.824 112.930
aJ = 3 6.042 10.170 95.542 98.195
bU = 0:7 6.220 15.376 107.804 110.981
bU = 1:2 6.220 15.376 101.380 102.822
bJ = 0:2 6.220 15.376 112.471 109.116
bJ = 0:5 6.220 15.376 94.713 99.212
LU = 1:2 7.827 16.271 133.222 130.757
LU = 1:4 9.414 16.912 161.932 157.380
LJ = 0:9 6.096 11.470 101.075 97.173
LJ = 1:1 6.184 14.073 103.493 102.365
 = 0:03 6.545 16.180 152.121 152.262
 = 0:04 5.895 14.573 74.595 74.701
 = 0:8 7.300 18.046 127.265 134.265
 = 1:1 5.757 14.232 93.842 90.523
 = 0:5 7.141 15.926 119.905 120.641
 = 0:6 7.583 16.154 127.374 128.399
Table 3.1: Sensitivity analysis under homogenous labour setting
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the more growth generated. This is because  captures how important the
branch innovations from economy J to the knowledge pool of economy U:
Higher  then would mean higher productivity for economy U: The growth
rate is thus higher. More innovations from economy U being produced means
there are more varieties for economy J to target and "branch innovate".
Also, more labour would be employed in R&D sector to keep up with the
growth rate, thus pushing up the rate of branch innovation. Both economies
enjoy from higher :
Now we would examine the e¤ects of increase in subsidy rates. Table
3.2 records how the two economies would behave if we x zJ at 0.00 and
increase zU . Growth rate, g; would increase because more rms can enter
R&D sector due to the subsidy. What we notice from the numerical results
is that there is one optimal zU for economy U (at zU = 0:85); that is, the
welfare would increase as zU increases from 0.00 to 0.85 and after 0.85, it
starts to decline. There are two e¤ects working in opposite direction as zU
increases. First, as zU increases, growth rate or growth e¤ect would increase.
Second, as we can see from (3.34), if zU is closer to 1, the rst term can
decrease; even though g may increase but after sometimes (1  zU ) would
dampen this e¤ect. Also, from the second term, we have the price ratio
















If zU increases, g and  would increase but both are constrained by the limits
of labour supplies. However, if zU is closer to 1, 1  zU would be closer to 0
and can make economy Us price much higher than that of economy J: Even
when the price of nal goods in economy U is very high relative to that of
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economy J; households in economy U would still consume the products from
economy U because in the static utility function, we can see that all varieties
are, to some degree, complementary. As such, the households in economy U
would cut down the amount of each variety consumed. If the relative price
of economy Us products is too high, relatively large income has to be spent
in purchasing goods from economy U: Then, the static utility of economy U
can be much lower (this is consumption e¤ect) and overwhelms the growth
e¤ect enjoyed by economy U:
E¤ect of economy Us R&D subsidy As for economy J; if the
subsidy rate zU increases from 0.00 to 0.94, its welfare would increase, after
that the welfare would start to decrease. In another word, the optimal zU
for economy J is 0.94. Meanwhile, we nd that total welfare of the two
economies combined is highest given zJ being xed at 0.00 at zU = 0:90.
We might wonder why the welfare of economy J can decrease if zU increases
at some value. How can zU a¤ect economy J: The intuition is similar to
the consumption e¤ect on economy U mentioned above. Economy U 0s price
become relatively higher than that of economy J so economy Js household
has to cut down the amount of each of economy Js variety consumed. Since
all varieties are complementary in the static utility, so for very high value
zU , the consumption e¤ect would dominate the growth e¤ect, causing lower
welfare for economy J:
So there is a conict in interest between the two economies. Economy U
would wish to have lower zU than the wish of economy J . However, the
worlds optimal zU is somewhere in between 0.94 and 0.85.
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aU = 5; bU = 1; aJ = 2; bJ = 0:3; LU = 1;
LJ = 1;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 1;  = 0:3
zU zJ g (%) W.U W.J T.W. %U %J
0 0 6.143 99.912 102.377 202.289 0.57276 0.57276
0:6 0 8.4562 128.5 134.91 263.41 0.55708 0.55707
0:75 0 9.1907 134.55 143.88 278.43 0.55343 0.55342
0.85 0 9.7269 136.31* 149.23 285.54 0.55104 0.55103
0.89 0 9.9531 135.61 150.86 286.48* 0.55008 0.5501
0:90 0 10.011 135.2 151.18 286.38 0.54983 0.54987
0.94 0 10.246 131.72 151.76* 283.47 0.5489 0.54891
Table 3.2: E¤ect of economy Us subsidy under homogenous labour setting
E¤ect of economy Js R&D subsidy Table 3.3 reports how the
subsidy of economy J will a¤ect each economy and the world as a whole.
Higher zJ leads to higher growth because the subsidy induces the R&D
activities in economy J and thus produces more branch innovations which,
through the reverse spill-over e¤ect, help increase the productivity of R&D
sector in economy U:What we also can observe is that economy U will enjoy
higher welfare for some low level of subsidy in economy J and above some
level of subsidy, the welfare of economy U will drop. That is the optimal zJ
for economy U for a given zU : The intuition is similar to the case when we
argue for the optimal zU for economy J: Here, economy U has no control over
zJ to force economy J to choose subsidy rate that only benets economy
U: In contrast, positive zJ would lead to lower welfare for economy J . This
means there would be again a conict between the two economies: economy
J does not want to subsidize but economy U wishes to see some positive
subsidy put in by economy J:
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Figure 3.1: Welfare of economy U under homogenous-labour case. Parame-
ters: LU = 1, LJ = 1:2; aU = 5; aJ = 2; bU = 1; bJ = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 1,
 = 0:3:
Figure 3.2: Welfare of economy J under homogenous-labour case. Parame-
ters: LU = 1, LJ = 1:2; aU = 5; aJ = 2; bU = 1; bJ = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 1,
 = 0:3:
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aU = 5; bU = 1; aJ = 2; bJ = 0:3; LU = 1;
LJ = 1;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 1;  = 0:3
zU zJ g (%) W.U W.J T.W. %U %J
0 0:1 8.4779 99.869 102.03 201.9 0.57262 0.5726
0 0:2 8.5003 99.73 101.5 201.23 0.57245 0.57245
0 0:3 8.5233 99.467 100.73 200.2 0.5723 0.57229
0 0:38 8.5423 99.136 99.89 199.2 0.57217 0.57216
Table 3.3: E¤ect of economy Js subsidy under homogenous labour setting
We do compute values of welfare for the cases where zU is xed higher values
and zJ are allowed to vary. What we observe is that the welfare of economy
J would decrease even at very small positive zJ : It may surprise us that
an increase in the subsidy rate of economy J , though improves the growth
rates, but leads to lower welfare of that economy. The reason is that even
though the growth rate is higher but if the reverse spill-over e¤ect is low, the
contribution of "branch innovation" to the R&D productivity in economy U
is not enough to spur higher growth to make up for the consumption e¤ect
that is negative due to the relatively higher local price. Here, we can see
that the best choice of subsidy rate for economy U given economy Js choice
of subsidy rate being 0:00 is 0.85 and the best choice of subsidy rate for
economy J given the zU being 0.85 is 0.00. This is the Nash equilibrium,
and we call this "corner Nash equilibrium" since the best choice for economy
J is having no subsidy.
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aU = 5; bU = 1; aJ = 2; bJ = 0:3; LU = 1;
LJ = 1;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 1;  = 0:7
zU zJ g (%) W.U W.J T.W. %U %J
0 0 7.8312 129.32 130.53 259.85 0.56062 0.56061
0:6 0 10.331 161.51 166.72 328.22 0.5486 0.5486
0:75 0 11.121 168.59 176.72 345.31 0.54572 0.54571
0:90 0 12.002 170.27 185.08 355.35 0.54289 0.5429
0.86 0 11.757 171.05* 183.3 354.36 0.54366 0.54364
0.94 0 12.254 167.04 185.9* 352.94 0.54216 0.54216
Table 3.4: E¤ect of economy Us subsidy under homogenous labour setting
with higher RSE
aU = 5; bU = 1; aJ = 2; bJ = 0:3; LU = 1;
LJ = 1;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 1;  = 0:7
zU zJ g (%) W.U W.J T.W. %U %J
0 0 7.8312 129.32 130.53 259.85 0.56062 0.56061
0 0:1 7.8709 129.68 130.57* 260.25 0.56038 0.56037
0 0:2 7.9117 129.96 130.44 260.4* 0.56012 0.56013
0 0:3 7.9538 130.12 130.08 260.21 0.55988 0.55988
0 0:38 7.9884 130.15* 129.58 259.73 0.55968 0.55968
0 0.45 8.0194 130.07 128.94 259.01 0.5595 0.5595
0 0.70 8.1357 128.38 123.78 252.16 0.55882 0.55886
Table 3.5: E¤ect of economy Js subsidy under homogenous labour setting
with higher RSE
However, if the reverse spill-over e¤ect is higher, we nd that the optimal
subsidy rate for economy J is positive and nite; that is, there should be
some subsidy in the R&D sector. Table 3.4 and 3.5 report the numerical
results for higher  ( = 0:7). In table 3.5, we can see that the welfare of
economy J is highest for a given value of zU = 0:0 is 15%. In this case,
the growth e¤ect dominates the consumption e¤ect at low levels of subsidy.
From our simulated results, we nd that the best choice of subsidy rate for
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economy U given economy Js choice of subsidy rate being 0:18 is 0.86 and
the best choice of subsidy rate for economy J given the zU being 0.86 is
0.18. We can say this is the Nash equilibrium, and we call this "interior
Nash equilibrium" since the best choices of subsidy rates for both economies
are positive.
Another interesting observation is that as the subsidy rate of either increases,
the leisure actually decreases. This can be explained by the fact that as we
subsidize more, more labour are needed in R&D sector and more varieties
are produced which again demands for more labour. Meanwhile, the total
possible amount labour is xed, thus leisure has to drop.
Summarizing all, we have the following results:
Result 1: The leisure declines with more subsidy on the R&D sector due
to more labour being used in both R&D and production sectors.
Result 2: There is an optimal subsidy rate for economy U given economy
Js choice of subsidy rate.
Result 3: For certain low values of  (or small reverse over e¤ect), it is
better for economy J not to subsidize because its welfare can be lower. But
for high range of ; the optimal subsidy rate for economy J is positive and
nite.
3.4 Skilled and unskilled labour
In this section, we will look at economies with skilled and unskilled labour.
The reason to incorporate two kinds of labour in this model is that we want
to see how the reverse over e¤ect would a¤ect the inequality within an econ-
omy and across the two economies. Gusta¤son and Segestrom (2011) try to
account for large wage di¤erences between the North and South economies,
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where the North is developed economy and South is the developing one. The
problem that they point out is that existing North-South models cannot ex-
plain the large wage gap between the North and the South. For example,
Sener (2006) shows that if the improvement of the product is 25%, the wage
of the North only 7% higher than that of the South. They do this by using a
model with one-way product cycles where the productions never shift back
from the South to the North. Therefore, there is no need for a condition
on the size of the quality improvement so that the production would not
shift back to the North. Our model is di¤erent. First, the model is a model
with variety expansion, not quality ladder. Second, we incorporate the re-
verse over e¤ect which, according to our results, if raised, would make the
wage gaps within an economy and between two economies - both skilled and
unskilled - larger.
We assume that each economy has a x amount of skilled and unskilled
labour. Skilled labour is used in R&D activities while to produce nal goods,
we need to use both skilled and unskilled labour. Each rm in economy i





where xi is the amount of nal goods produced by a rm in economy i;
and Hxi (Lxi)is the amount of skilled labour (unskilled labour) required to
produce xi.
With that, the rm would try to minimize the cost wHi Hxi+wLi Lxi subject




Setting Lagrangian function:  = wHi Hxi+wLi Lxi 

xi   Hxi L1 i

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Note that the ratio
wHi
wLi
is proportional to Li but inversely proportional to
Hxi: This is because more unskilled labour, Lxi, would mean higher marginal
productivity of Hxi and vice versa. The relative wage is also dependent on :
the higher ; the higher the relative wage; since  measures the importance
of Hxi in the production of nal goods.
Also, note here that Li; the total unskilled labour in economy i, is xed
and the amount of unskilled labour has to spread out evenly among the
production of nal goods in each economy; that is the amount of unskilled
labour employed by any rm in economy i to nal goods production is the






















Whenever there is a shortage of skilled labour in the manufacturing (say, due
to the increasing demand for manufactured goods), the market mechanism
would push up the wage for skilled labour and attract the skilled labour.
There are two e¤ects working in this process. First, increasing wage of skilled
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labour in the manufacturing sector would attract more skilled labour over.
But the R&D sector then has to match the wage as well until the skilled
workers are indi¤erent between R&D and manufacturing. The second e¤ect
is that this process would make the marginal cost high, and so does the
price; this dampens the demand for products of the respective economy.
This means that the choice that each economy needs to make is the amount
of skilled workers devoted to nal goods production and the rest would go to
the R&D sector. After the skilled labour market clears, the unskilled labour
market naturally falls into place.
















Here Linixi is the amount of unskilled labour used to produce one unit of nal
goods in economy i, so we can see that the wage ratio depends on  and the
amount of labour devoted to produce one unit of nal goods.
Also from (3.38), we can nd the cost of producing xi of nal goods in terms
of wages:

























The prot of a rm in economy i, as usual, is the product of net benet
earned from each unit of nal goods and the demand of nal goods received







































where xi is the amount of nal goods demanded of a production rm in econ-
omy i, and the cost of producing one unit of nal goods is
 
wHi Hxi   wLi Lxi

=xi:











where Pxi is the price of nal goods in economy i: Here, again in steady
state, Pxi would grows at the same rate with the total number of varieties
produced by both economies. Similar to the case of homogenous labour, we
have the price to be marked up by the factor of 1 ; that is the smaller , the
higher the markup in price.





Let zi be the subsidy rate that economy i applies on its R&D sector to
reduce the cost. Similar to the specication of no arbitrage condition of
homogenous labour, we have:
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U + _VU
CU (1  zU ) =
J + _VJ
CJ (1  zJ) = r (3.48)
where Ci = aiwHi=ni, Ci is the cost of producing one innovation in economy
i, given as the product of skilled labour wage and the amount of skilled
labour used to produce one innovation. Again, in steady state, we have
_VU = _CU = 0 and _VJ = _CJ = 0. Combining (3.45), (3.46), (3.48), and the










































here Hxi, which in steady state is equal to ni Hxi; is proportional to ai - the
higher the R&D productivity, more skilled labour can be released to produce
nal goods. The third equality is established by applying equation (3.41).
Now we also need to see how the total demand for nal goods (nixi) would



























The market for unskilled labour is always cleared because unskilled labour,
which is xed, is spread out evenly over the nal goods production. Now,
we examine skilled labour market clearing condition. As mentioned, skilled
labour is split into two parts - R&D and nal goods production. From
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 (g + )
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nU   nJ =

g
: Specifying each economys clear-





g + (1 + )

(1  zU ) (g + )









(1  zJ) (g + )
1   + g

(3.53)
Note that (3.52) and (3.53) are somewhat similar to (3.29) and (3.30) when
zi = 0 and  = 0, except for the presence of :
Tax and subsidy
Before analysing the steady state condition, we would look at the govern-
ment budget. Similar to case of homogenous labour, the subsidies would be
funded by the taxes on labour income. However, here, we do not have leisure
and also, we have two types of labour in this model. Total income of labour
would be the product of wage times the labour provided LiwLi +HiwHi in
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economy i; so the total tax revenue is fLiwLi +HiwHig ti. At any point
in time, the ow of innovations generated is also the number of rms that
come to birth. The total amount of labour employed in R&D sector in econ-
omy i at any particular time is
ai
Ki








_nizi. Combining with the government budget balance, in the sense
that the amount of subsidy is equal to amount of tax revenue collected, we
have the following:





fLUwLU +HUwHUg [nU + nJ ] (3.54)
fLJwLJ +HJwHJg tJ = wHJaJ
nU   nJ zJ _nJ
tJ =
wHJzJaJ _nJ
fLJwLJ +HJwHJg [nU   nJ ] (3.55)
Proposition 2: In the model with two types of labour, there exists unique
positive g and  in steady state equilibrium if and only if HU >
aU
1   .
Proof: Let  =

g





1 + (1 + )

(1  zU ) (g + )







(1  zJ) (g + )
1   + g

(3.57)
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1   + g
  






1 + (1 + )

(1  zU )
1   + 1

> 0
So that means  is increasing in g for economy U , denote this relationship





(1  zJ) (g + )






1   + 1

> 0 for positive 
So this means  is decreasing in g for economy J; denote this relationship
as J (g) :







This means that the two graphs J (g) and U (g) will intersect at a unique
point for  > 0: But if  > 0, then from (3.57), we have positive root. Now
we have to identify whether the two graphs would cut in positive region.
From (3.57),
If  ! 0+; then g !1+;





From (3.56), we have:
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1   > 0
(3.60)











1   + 1

> 0 (3.61)
Combining all the conditions, (3.58), (3.59), (3.60) and (3.61), we can show
that the two steady state equilibrium equations (3.57) and (3.56), has a




1   > 0: Since  = =g so for
positive and nite g we have a positive and nite  since  is also positive
and nite. This completes the proof 





1   , there exists a unique
equilibrium where both g and  are positive. The condition points out that
the e¤ective skilled labour has to be big enough so that there can be positive
growth. Observe that the higher , the bigger the e¤ective skilled labour
must be. This is because if  is high, the monopolistic power is small, there
is less incentive for R&D activities and it is better for skilled labour to
be used in manufacturing nal goods. The supply of e¤ective skilled labour
should be high enough to meet demands in both sectors or else skilled labour
is only employed in manufacturing sector. If the patience of the people is
low, they would tend to rather consume than investing in the future. More
skilled labour would be demanded in manufacturing sector. The amount
of e¤ective skilled labour must be big enough so that there can be skilled
labour for R&D sector. Similarly, if the contribution factor of skilled labour
in production, , is big, more skilled labour are needed in manufacturing
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sector. Thus, again, the amount of e¤ective skilled labour has to be big in
order to meet the demand for skilled labour in both sector. Knowing the
existence of equilibrium with a necessary and su¢ cient condition, we now
would examine how the parameters would a¤ect the growth rate and the
rate of branch innovation. All these are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3:We have the following results: (i) If HJ or HU increases
and  > 0, g and  will be higher. Else if  = 0, only HU a¤ects the growth
rate. (ii) If aJ or aU decreases and  > 0, g and  will be higher. Else if
 = 0, only aU a¤ects the growth rate (iii) If ;  and  increase, g will
fall (iv). If  increases, g and  will rise. (v) The productivities of nal
goods, LU and LJ , would not a¤ect the growth rate.
Proof:
Parts (i) and (ii):
Here, we combine the proofs for parts (i) and (ii) because Hi and ai are
inversely related.
If HJaJ increases, then we have for any xed value of J (g) we have a higher g
since (1 zJ )(g+)1  +g is increasing in g: This means the graph J (g) would
shift upward in the (; g) plane. We can see this from (3.59). This would
cause both  and g; so thus ; to rise because 0U (g) > 0:
If HUaU increases, then we have for any xed value of U (g) we have a higher
g since (1 zU )(g+)1  + g is increasing in g: This means the graph U (g)
would shift to the right in (; g) plane. We can see this from (3.60) and
(3.61). This would cause g to rise but  would fall because 0J (g) < 0.
However, even though  decreases, it is not clear if  would decrease or




























(1  zJ) (g + )
1   + g

< 0 (3.62)
So the relationship between  and g in economy J is positive. That is, if g
increases due to some external factor (here we have e¤ective skilled labour
of economy U; HUaU , to increase),  will also increase.
Part (iii):
If  increases, then from (3.56), for any xed value of g;  would be higher
because 1  increases as  increases. That means, the graph U (g) would
shift upwards in (; g) plane. This corresponds well with the intercept shown
in (3.59). At the same time, from (3.57), for any xed value of ; g would
be lower. Then the graph J (g) would shift leftwards in (; g) plane. This
would lead to lower g: However, we cannot see how  would be a¤ected
because how  changes is not clear.
The proofs for  and  are similar.
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Part (iv):
From (3.56), when  increases, for any xed , we would have higher g
because
1 + 
1 + (1 + )
falls. That means U (g) would shift right on the
(; g) plane. U (g) would then cut J (g) at higher g but  would fall. But
here again  does not a¤ect (3.57) but following the same argument with
the proof of (1) with (3.62), we have higher :
Part (v): This is obvious because the unskilled labours do not enter the
equilibrium equation.
We can consider HUaU and
HJ
aJ
as the e¤ective skilled labour of economy U and
J respectively. Here, economy Js e¤ective skilled labour contribute to the
global growth rate through the reverse spill-over e¤ect, which increases the
knowledge pool for economy U , thereby, making skilled labour in economy
U more e¤ective. So if reverse spill-over e¤ect (RSE) is zero, the growth
rate only depends on economy Us skilled labour. The branch innovations
only provide more varieties to the world economy but not knowledge.
The monopolistic power is inversely related to  - higher  would cause
the prot of the rm lower, leading to lower investment into R&D and thus
lower growth rate. Increase of  means that more skilled labour are needed
in the manufacturing sector and thus less skilled labour for R&D sector in
both economies; thus global growth rate is lower. Also, if the people are less
patient - that is,  is higher - the people would care more about consuming
than investing for the future. They then choose to spend more skilled labour
to produce nal goods and less on R&D activities. Therefore, the growth
rate would drop.
Part (iv) is rather intuitive. Higher reverse spill-over e¤ect would mean that
the R&D sectors in both economies are more productive and thus produce
higher growth.
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Proposition 4: An increase in the subsidy rates in both economies raises
the growth rate.
Proof:





1 + (1 + )

(1  zU ) (g + )







(1  zJ) (g + )
1   + g

(3.64)
As zU increases, for the same ; g would increase, so the graph U (g) would
shift to the right on the (; g) plane. This would cause g to increase. As zJ
increases, for same ; g would increase, so the graph J (g) would shift to
the right on the (; g) plane; this would also cause g to increase too.
Proposition 5: Any increases (decreases) in g that is caused by decreases
(increases) in any of the parameters  and  would lead to lower (higher)
nal productions in both economies.
Proof:







where h^ (g) =
 (g + )
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Note that h^ (g) is equal to a xed number that is not related to ; ; : This
means that ; , and  only a¤ect g in the expression (3.65). From the (3)
of Proposition 4, we know that if ,  or  decreases, g rises and so does 
and vice versa.
Now for (3.51), we have:
nUxU =

aU (g + )
(1  )
g + 





HU   aUg (g + )











= (HJ   aJ) L1 J (3.69)
Let:
qU (g) = HU   aUg (g + )
g + (1 + )
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From (3.53), we have =g = HJ
aJ h^(g)













are independent of ; ; and :. Then =g is does not
change when ;  or  changes.
Consider:
	 (g; ) =
aUg (g + )
g + (1 + )
=
aU (g + )
1 + (1 + ) (=g)
=
aUg (1 + =g)






Clearly as ;  or  decreases, 	 (g; ) would increase since =g is indepen-
dent of these parameters, therefore easily, we can see that qU (g) decreases.
Similarly, let qJ (g) = HJ   aJ:
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Clearly as ;  or  decreases, we can see that qJ (g) decreases.
To summarize, this means that when g increases (decreases) due to changes
in parameters ;  or , nixi (where i = U; J) decreases (increases). This is
because as g increases, more skilled labour is spent in R&D and less in nal
good production. 
Proposition 5 grants us the ability to trace the movement of the skilled
labour when there is a change in parameters  and  - the patience of
the households and the monopolistic powers of the rm. We can see if 
and  decrease and so g increases, there are less skilled labour spent in
manufacturing while the amount of unskilled labour is xed. This leads to
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an interesting result that the production of goods actually goes down while
the number of variety is increasing at a higher rate. During this process, the
wage of skilled labour would increase more relative to that of the unskilled
because there is less skilled labour in the manufacturing sector. This would
continue to occur until the demand for skilled labour in manufacturing sector
is met to produce the right amount of goods and where there is no more
change in wage. In another word, the wage ratio wHwL adjusts till the economy
reaches a new equilibrium. The question then is how the wage ratio would
adjust if  and  changes. When changes in patience and monopolistic
power, how would the inequality - measured by wHwL - within an economy









>1,we can see that the wage gap between the two types of labour within




(where i = U; J)would decrease if  decreases and vice versa.
Proof:
Part (i): The proof of part (i) follows Proposition 5 where we know that if
 or  or  decreases, the total productions in both economies would drop,
that is, nixi would fall.










6 In the case where
wHi
wLi
< 1, we nd that decreases in  or  would make the ratio
smaller. In reality, skilled labour can always convert to unskilled labour. We do show that
if more skilled labour choose to convert to unskilled labour, the wage ratio would become
bigger. The movement will continue until wHi = wLi:
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So the wage ratio would increase. Thus this would make the inequality worse
if wHi is already greater than wLi:
Part (ii):
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> 1; we can see that the wage gap between the two types
of labour within economy U would be smaller.























































































the wage gap between the two types of labour within economy J would be
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smaller.
Proposition 6 shows us how inequality can be worsened if the people are
more patient or the monopolistic power is higher or when the contribution
factor of skilled labour is higher. Here, the R&D sector would demand for
more skilled labour. If the people are more patient, they would rather invest
in the long term - invest in R&D - to have more variety. If the mark-up
of prices, 1 ; is high, rms would demand more skilled workers to do R&D
works. Thus, overall, we can see that there is movement of skilled workers
away from the manufacturing sector. By (3.38), we know that wage ratio






















As for the contribution of skilled labour in the manufacturing sector , its
decrease means that skilled labour is less important in the manufacturing
sector From (3.78), if  decreases, 1  decreases - this e¤ect pulls down
the wage ratio. On the other hand, from Proposition 3, we know that if 
decreases, growth rate would increase. The reason for growth rate to increase
is that more skilled labour are in R&D. Thus, Hxi will be lower, causing LiHxi




Proposition 7: If the reverse spill-over e¤ect increases, the wage ratio
within an economy would be higher.
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As the reverse spill-over e¤ect, , increases, we knows from Proposition
3 that g will increase. From (3.52), (g+)1  + g will increase (because g
increases), therefore g+g+(1+) will decrease.
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Increase of (g+)gg+(1+) means that more skilled labour would be spent in the
R&D sector and less on manufacturing sector. Therefore, HxU would fall.





, the wage ratio would increase.
Similarly, from (3.53), we know that HRJ - amount of labour spent in R&D
in economy J - would increase because HRJ = (=g) g = : We know that
 increases if  increase (following Proposition 3). If more skilled labour






; the wage ratio would decrease when  increases.
Wage inequality, thus, would be worsened if the branch innovations become
more important or the reverse spill-over e¤ect becomes higher. This is be-
cause the reverse spill-over e¤ect makes R&D sector more productive and
rate of return would be higher, encouraging more investment in the R&D
sector. Since the amount of skilled labour is xed, more labour spent in
R&D would mean less on manufacturing.
In the beginning, the less developed economy may learn to copy or have very
small innovations which may not contribute signicantly to the knowledge
pool. However, as it grows to be more creative with the accummulation of
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knowledge, the branch innovations produced by this less developed economy
can have greater impact on the knowledge pool. With this, the skilled
workers are more valuable in both economies relatively to the unskilled ones.
Proposition 8: If the reverse spill-over e¤ect increases, the wage ratios
between wage rates of skilled workers and between wage rates of unskilled
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(3.80)
Now we need to nd the price ratio:
i




























Now, putting together, we get:
i





























The above expression is also the rate of return in economy i. In steady state,










































[nU + nJ ] aJ (1  zJ)









[nU + nJ ] =nUaJ (1  zJ)
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Observe that all are parameters except for +g :We see that
+g
 is increasing














where h^ (g) =
 (g + )
1   + g:
As  increases, h^ (g) increases because g increases. So g decreases. This
means 1 + g increases.
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We can see that only +g changes as  changes; the rests are parameters.
So wLUwLJ would increase as  increases. 
Proposition 8 tells us how the reverse spill-over e¤ect would cause the in-
equality across the economies to be bigger. This is mainly through the
relative price increase in economy U . From (3.82) in the Proof of Proposi-
tion 8, we have the price ratio
PxU
PxJ
would increase so the wages in economy






matters in determining the price ratio when  increases be-
cause g+(1+)(g+)g= is xed as shown in the Proof of Proposition 8. We know
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that an increase in  would increase nUnJ , thus the number of varieties in econ-
omy U would increase more relative to that of economy J: Meanwhile, the
amounts of skilled labour and unskilled labour are xed in both economies,
thus, the demand for labour - both skilled and unskilled - in economy U





In this section, we compute the welfares of economy U and J . Once we solve
for g and , we can substitute into the expressions for respective leisures,
demands for nal goods which constitute the welfare of a representative
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(  1) 2 (3.85)
The welfare function of economy i equal to the revenue that economy i earns
divided by the price index. And after substituting the terms, we have welfare
functions in terms of g and . The nal expression of the welfare function
of economy i have growth e¤ect, g=
 
(  1) 2 and the consumption e¤ect
- captured in the other two terms. Now we would analyse the R&D subsidy
e¤ects on the two economieswelfares.
3.4.2 Analysis
Here, we would analyse how R&D subsidies would a¤ect the two economies
in terms of growth and welfares. The bench-mark parameters that we are
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using are: HU = 0:5, HJ = 0:5; LU = 0:5; LJ = 0:5; aU = 5; aJ = 2;
bU = 1; bJ = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 0:6,  = 0:3: Similar to the rst part
with homogenous labour, we would also examine the case where  = 0:7 to
illustrate numerically how any change of the reverse spillover e¤ect would
a¤ect the growth e¤ect and the consumption e¤ect in each economy. In
particular, when  is small, the Nash equilibrium is a "corner solution"
(zJ = 0 and zU is a positive value). However, when  is big enough, the
Nash equilibrium is an "interior solution" where zU and zJ are positive
values.
Table 3.6 reports how the growth rate, branch innovation rate and welfares
of the two economies would respond to the change in each parameter with
other parameters being constant. We have a benchmark set of parameters
and from there we change parameters one by one. Here we let zU and zJ to
be zeroes.
As we increase , the growth rate and branch-innovation rate would be lower
and the welfare of both economies would drop. This is consistent with the
result reported in Proposition 4. This is because 1 is the markup of the price
from the marginal cost so an increase of  would mean lower monopolistic
power of the rms in both economies. As such, the rms would invest less
in R&D activities.
Improvement in R&D productivity in either economy would help the growth
to be higher (see Table 3.6). If aU decreases, one unit of labour can produce
more innovations in economy U ; this means we would have higher growth.
Meanwhile, in order to keep up with the high growth of base innovations
generated in economy U , economy J needs to allocate more workers into the









 (g + )
1   + g
 (3.86)
We can see that
@
@g
> 0. Therefore, if g increases, we should have  to
increase:
According to Table 3.6, if HJ=aJ or HU=aU increases, g and  increase and
so do the welfare of the R&D productivity of economy J . From (3.86), we
knows that g would also increase. Intuitively, as more branch innovations are
successful in economy, this spill-over knowledge from economy J to economy
U would increase. This helps the creation of base innovations to be easier,
thus higher is g:
The unskilled labour, LU and LJ , do not appear in the two equilibrium
equations (3.52) and (3.53). As we can see from Table 4, changing these
parameters would not change the growth rate and the branch innovation
rate. However, LU and LJ would change the welfare of the two economies.
A rise in discount factor  would lead to lower growth and rate of branch
innovation and welfare as the whole, as also proved in Proposition 4. Results
in Table 3.6 is consistent with this.
The spillover e¤ect  benets the world economy - the higher it is, the more
growth generated; and economy J also have to devote more labour to keep
up with the growth rate, thus pushing up the rate of branch imitation. Both
economies enjoy from higher :
An increase in  would lead to lower growth and branch innovation rate just
as proved in Proposition 4.
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Benchmark
aJ = 2  = 0:3 HJ = 0:5 LJ = 0:5  = 0:035
aU = 5  = 0:6 LU = 0:5 HU = 0:5  = 0:3
Parameters g (%)  (%) Js Welfare Us Welfare
Benchmark parameters results
8.85 18.40 155.759 163.614
Alternative parameters results
 = 0:35 8.23 17.119 108.388 115.682
 = 0:4 7.59 15.778 74.256 80.988
aU = 4 11.10 18.681 194.906 204.232
aU = 6 7.329 18.117 129.640 136.434
aJ = 1 9.151 36.887 168.358 172.790
aJ = 3 8.638 12.243 146.219 156.897
HU = 0:4 7.022 18.046 122.942 128.367
HU = 0:6 10.652 18.634 122.942 128.367
HJ = 0:4 8.736 14.704 148.440 158.914
HJ = 0:6 8.938 22.094 161.447 167.303
LU = 0:4 8.85 18.40 154.7505 161.840
LU = 0:6 8.85 18.40 156.592 165.072
LJ = 0:4 8.85 18.40 154.229 162.849
LJ = 0:6 8.85 18.40 157.018 164.247
 = 0:03 8.952 18.611 216.493 225.657
 = 0:04 8.748 18.185 116.836 123.709
 = 0:55 9.064 18.843 160.643 168.498
 = 0:65 8.643 17.968 151.087 158.942
 = 0:5 9.351 18.472 164.435 172.627
 = 0:6 9.837 18.537 172.877 181.391
Table 3.6: Sensitivity analysis under two-labour setting
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Table 3.7 records how the two economies would behave if we x zJ at 0.00
and increase zU . Growth rate, g; would increase because more rms can
enter the R&D sector due to the subsidy. What we notice from the numer-
ical results is that there is one optimal zU for economy U (at zU = 0:83):
The optimal zU for economy J is 0.91. Meanwhile, the value of zU that
gives highest welfare of both economies combined is 0.87. As such there is
a conict of interest between the two economies, economy J would prefer
economy U to have a higher subsidy rate than the preference of economy U
itself.
To understand why there is an optimal subsidy rate zU for economy U , we
refer back to the previous part with homogenous labour. There are two
e¤ects working in opposite direction as zU increases. First, as zU increases,
the growth rate or growth e¤ect would increase. Second, as we can see from
(3.84), if zU is closer to 1, the rst term can decrease; even though g may
increase but after sometimes (1  zU ) would dampen this e¤ect. Also, from
the second term, we have the price ratio PU=PJ ; and the economic intuition





g + (1 + 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If zU increases, g and  would increase but both are constrained by the limits
of skilled labour supplies. However, if zU is closer to 1, 1 zU would be closer
to 0 and can make economy Us price much higher than that of economy J:
Even when the price of nal goods in economy U is very high relative to that
of economy J; households in economy U would still consume the products
from economy U because in the static utility function, we can see that all
varieties are, to some degree, complementary. As such, the households in
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economy U would cut down the amount of each variety consumed but not
cut all. If the relative price of economy Us products is too high, relatively
large income has to be spent in purchasing goods from economy U: Then,
the static utility of economy U can be much lower (this is consumption
e¤ect) and overwhelms the growth e¤ect enjoyed by economy U: Another
way to understand the mechanism behind the welfare results above is to see
the movement of skilled labour. As we subsidize R&D, more skilled labour
would be spent in R&D and less on nal goods production.
For economy J; there can be an optimal zU for economy J (see Tables 3.7
and 3.9). Economy J also enjoys the higher growth e¤ect due to the increase
in economy U s subsidy. However, if the subsidy in economy U increase,
we have higher price ratio PUPJ , causing lower consumption of each variety
produced by economy U: Since all varieties, produced by both economies,
are complementary - as observed in the static utility, for very high value of
zU (closer to 1), the consumption e¤ect dominates the growth e¤ect, causing
lower welfare.
Also, from Table 3.8, we can see that the subsidy rate of economy J does
not help its own economy. As you can see the welfare drops as we increase
subsidy rate of economy J while xing zU : Economy U would enjoy a little
from very small positive amount of zJ ; 0.02. This is because the contribution
of branch innovations from economy J is little so if economy J subsidizes on
its R&D sector, they would not gain much from growth e¤ect (as we can see,
g changes very little) meanwhile, the consumption e¤ect is very large. So
as a whole, the welfare in economy J would fall as zJ increases. Therefore,
 plays important role in determining whether the subsidy from economy
J is e¤ective. For some higher  - meaning the branch innovations from
economy J is very signicant, we would have growth e¤ect to dominate the
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aU = 5; HU = 0:5; aJ = 2; HJ = 0:5; LU = 0:5;
LJ = 0:5;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 0:6;  = 0:3
zU zJ g (%) W.U W.J
0:1 0 9.094 167.06 159.45
0:2 0 9.349 170.56 163.24
0:3 0 9.614 174.08 167.13
0:4 0 9.891 177.57 171.08
0.5 0 10.179 180.95 175.07
0.6 0 10.481 184.13 179.05
0.7 0 10.797 186.84 182.89
0.8 0 11.128 188.51 186.28
0.83 0 11.23 188.62* 186.85
0.9 0 11.476 187.35 188.31
0.91 0 11.510 186.86 188.33*
0.92 0 11.546 186.52 188.28
Table 3.7: E¤ect of economy Us subsidy under two-labour setting
consumption e¤ect for some positive zJ : This claim is shown in Table 3.9
and Table 3.10. Now, the optimal zU for economy U when zJ = 0 is 0.83
while the optimal zJ for economy J when zU = 0:83 is 0.00. This is the
corner Nash equilibrium.
In Table 3.9, we can see that xing zJ at zero and varying zU ; we have
welfare of economy U would be optimal at zU = 0:6; the optimal zU for
economy J is 0.74. Meanwhile, in Table 3.10, we can see a positive e¤ect
from subsidy of R&D activities from economy J: The optimal zJ for economy
J; given zU being xed at zero, is 0.12 with the value 49.025. Economy U
also enjoys a spill-over e¤ect from the subsidy in economy J; its welfare is
optimal at zJ = 0:34: Here, we also have a conict. Economy U would
want economy J to subsidize its R&D activity at a rate higher than what
economy J wants. From the numerical results, we see that for any given
R&D subsidy rate of one economy, the other economy would have the best
response with an subsidy rate which is positive. As such, the interior Nash
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aU = 5; HU = 0:5; aU = 0:5; HJ = 0:3; LU = 0:5;
LJ = 0:5;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 0:6;  = 0:3
zU zJ g (%) W.U W.J
0 0 8.850 163.61 155.76
0 0:12 8.863 163.62* 155.52
0 0:2 8.877 163.57 155.18
0 0:3 8.890 163.45 154.68
0 0:4 8.904 163.25 154
0 0.5 8.919 162.91 153.05
0 0.6 8.933 162.4 151.72
0 0.7 8.948 161.6 149.78
0 0.8 8.962 160.29 146.73
0 0.9 8.978 157.8 141.02
Table 3.8: E¤ect of economy Js subsidy under two-labour setting
equilibrium is: zJ = 0:14 and zU = 0:60, with the corresponding welfare of
economy U being 64.537 and that of economy J being 55.64. However, if
the two economies cooperate with one another on setting the subsidy rates
to obtain the best combined welfare, economy J would choose zJ = 0:22 and
economy U would choose zU = 0:76: With these, the highest total welfare
that can be achieved through R&D subsidies is 120:49, where economy Us
welfare is 64:494 and economy Js welfare is 55:993. That is to say, if the
governments of the two economies were to set the R&D subsidy rates on
their own, they would naturally set the rates at the Nash equilibrium where
they would react towards each others subsidy policy. Therefore, in order to
achieve the social optimal level, there must be a cooperation from the two
economies to set their respective optimal subsidy rates. Yet, cooperation
might incur risk of one economy deviating because given the subsidy rates
that achieves best combine welfare, one would rather want to deviate from it
because the subsidy rate that it has now is not the optimal given the others
choice of subsidy rate. Consider the case where one economy faithfully
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aU = 14; HU = 0:5; aJ = 7; HJ = 0:5; LU = 0:5
LJ = 0:5;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 0:6;  = 0:7
zU zJ g (%) W.U W.J
0 0 3.291 59.637 48.963
0:1 0 3.418 60.72 50.149
0:2 0 3.549 61.747 51.334
0:3 0 3.687 62.689 52.507
0:4 0 3.8295 63.49 53.634
0.5 0 3.979 64.072 54.676
0.6 0 4.135 64.291* 55.556
0.7 0 4.298 63.882 56.127
0.74 0 4.365 63.43 56.208*
0.8 0 4.469 62.243 56.062
0.9 0 4.648 57.486 54.346
Table 3.9: E¤ect of economy Us subsidy under two-labour setting with
higher RSE
abides to the social optimal level while the other breaks the agreement and
chooses its best response subsidy rates. Then the former will su¤er the loss
in welfare with respect to its respective social optimal welfare, while the
latter will enjoy higher welfare. But the sum of the two economieswelfares
is lower than that of the social optimal case. That means the loss in the
welfare of the former economy is larger than the gain of the latter one. Thus,
if cooperating, whichever economy enjoys more from the "cooperation" in
the subsidy rate setting would have to compensate the other enough so that
it does not choose to deviate.
Summarizing all, we have the following results:
Result 4: There is an optimal subsidy rate for economy U given economy
Js choice of subsidy rate.
Result 5: For certain low values of  (or small reverse spill-over e¤ect), it
is better for economy J not to subsidize because its welfare can be lower.
But for high range of ; the optimal subsidy rate for economy J is positive
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aU = 14; HU = 0:5; aJ = 7; HJ = 0:5; LU = 0:5
LJ = 0:5;  = 0:3;  = 0:035;  = 0:6;  = 0:7
zU zJ g W.U W.J
0 0 3.291 59.637 48.963
0 0:1 3.306 59.801 49.024
0 0.12 3.309 59.829 49.025*
0 0:2 3.322 59.922 48.988
0 0:3 3.338 59.984 48.823
0 0.34 3.344 59.988* 48.710
0 0:4 3.354 59.965 48.481
0 0.5 3.371 59.836 47.896
0 0.6 3.389 59.537 46.943
0 0.7 3.407 59.113 45.404
0 0.8 3.425 57.917 42.787
0 0.9 3.444 55.717 37.558
Table 3.10: E¤ect of economy Js subsidy under two-labour setting with
higher RSE
and nite.
Our results show that the more R&D activities in economy J are encouraged,
the higher the growth rate. Whereas in Yin and Keith (2010), more labour
spent on innovating in the South (the counter part of economy J in this
model) would reduce the growth rate if the reverse spill-over e¤ect is small.
The reason is that in their research, they allow for imitation as a force that
takes away the business of the rm in the North (the counterpart of economy
U) which induces less innovation in the North. If the South focuses more
on innovations and less on imitations, the direct e¤ect that less labour is
available for the multinationals, thus lowering the multinationalization rate.
There is competition e¤ect which works opposite of this direct e¤ect: more
multinationals will move to the South to make use of the lower cost, thus
pushing up the multinationalization rate. If the direct e¤ect dominates -
multinationalization rate is low, more labour being locked in the production
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Figure 3.3: Welfare of economy U under two-labour case. Parameters: HU =
0:5, HJ = 0:5; LU = 0:5; LJ = 0:5; aU = 5; aJ = 2; bU = 1; bJ = 0:3;
 = 0:035;  = 0:6,  = 0:7
Figure 3.4: Welfare of economy J under two-labour case. Parameters: HU =
0:5, HJ = 0:5; LU = 0:5; LJ = 0:5; aU = 5; aJ = 2; bU = 1; bJ = 0:3;
 = 0:035;  = 0:6,  = 0:7
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sector in the North and less on the Norths R&D activities. So, if the Souths
innovations contribute little to the worlds knowledge pool, the e¤ect of
lower multinationalization rate dominates the contribution of the Souths
innovation, causing lower growth. In Yin and Keith (2010), it is interesting
that when the competition e¤ect dominates at a high imitation rate and
the reverse spill-over e¤ect is zero, the global growth rate is still lower as
imitation rate increases. Now if the Souths innovations are more signicant,
the contribution from the South can boost the global growth rate because the
knowledge pool is larger. In our model, there is no imitation by economy
J but only innovations; whether economy J innovates, it does not a¤ect
economy Us rms. There is no labour movement necessary to be made.
Our research goes one step further, that is not done in other studies as far as
we know, to see how the welfares of the two economies would varies with the
subsidy rates. We nd that for a weak reverse spill-over e¤ect, the optimal
subsidy rate for economy J given economy Us subsidy rate can be zero. This
is because the growth e¤ect is less than the consumption e¤ect in economy
J. However, for a strong reverse spill-over e¤ect, the optimal subsidy rate
for economy J is positive and nite. As for economy U, there is a positive
and nite optimal subsidy rate for any given subsidy rate of economy J. The
interaction in setting subsidy rates produces a Nash equilibrium.
3.5 Conclusion
We have examined open economic setting with one being a leader (economy
U) in innovation while the other (economy J) making use of the concepts of
the innovations produces branch innovations. Economy Js branch innova-
tions have similar concepts with the original innovations but have di¤erent
applicational values. The branch innovations are allowed to have some re-
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verse spill-over e¤ect, which is not seen in other works. The importance of
the knowledge of branch innovations in the global knowledge pool a¤ects
many key results in this chapter. We study how subsidy policies in each
economy would a¤ect the global growth rate, welfares of the two economies
and as well as how they interact with each other.
Our analysis shows several new results. First, the subsidies in both economies
will always increase the global growth rate but they will not necessar-
ily increase economy Js welfare even for a very small amount of subsidy.
Only when the reverse spill-over e¤ect from the branch innovation is strong
enough, does the welfare of economy J increase for a small amount of subsidy.
This also leads to the second point that there exists an optimal subsidy rate
for economy J given economy Us choice of subsidy if the reverse spill-over
e¤ect is large enough. Meanwhile, there always exists an optimal subsidy
rate for economy U given economy Js choice of subsidy rate. The interaction
of the two economieschoices of subsidy rates gives us a Nash equilibrium
where no economy wishes to change their choice. Thirdly and also lastly, we
introduce skilled and unskilled labour into the model and analyse the wage
inequality. We nd that the wage ratio within an economy and the wage
ratios between the wage rates of skilled workers and between the wage rates
of the unskilled workers in economy U and economy J would be higher if
the reverse spill-over e¤ect is stronger.
The key features of our model are the introduction of branch innovations
which reects well how economies like Japan would produce innovations
based on the original concepts produced by leading economies, and the re-
verse spill-over e¤ect of the branch innovations to the global knowledge pool
which further helps the developed economy U to be more creative.
We are aware of the short-comings of the model; for example, allowing only
201
labour as the input might not be realistic. We could introduce physical capi-
tal into the model and to see how the interaction between the two economies
would di¤er.
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